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INFORMAL DEFERENCE: A HISTORICAL,
EMPIRICAL, AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF
PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell
ABSTRACT—The Federal Circuit has been the target of a flurry of criticism
regarding its claim construction jurisprudence. District judges, members of
the bar, academics, and even the court’s own judges have been highly
critical of the court’s rate of reversal of claim construction appeals, which
peaked above 40%. Partially in response to the critics, the Federal Circuit
undertook to reassess its claim construction jurisprudence in the Phillips
case in 2005. The empirical and theoretical studies that have emerged since
Phillips suggest that little has changed: the Federal Circuit’s high reversal
rate persists and the court’s procedures remain unaltered.
This Article contradicts those perceptions based on a comprehensive
empirical analysis of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence
from 2000 through 2011. We find that the reversal rate has dropped
significantly since Phillips, dipping to 16.5% in 2009 from a high of 44%
in 2004. Not only has the reversal rate plummeted, it has done so across the
board: all judges on the Federal Circuit are now more likely to affirm claim
construction decisions than they were previously, and nearly every
technology sector case is more likely to be affirmed on appeal. Phillips
signaled the beginning of an era of increasing yet “informal deference” to
district court claim construction decisions.
The current era of informal deference does not mean, however, that the
problems of claim construction have been adequately resolved.
Notwithstanding the drop in the reversal rate, the Federal Circuit’s
adherence to the de novo standard has frustrated district courts’ distinctive
capabilities for apprehending and resolving the factual disputes inherent in
claim construction determinations, undermined the transparency of the
claim construction process, discouraged detailed and transparent
explanations of claim construction reasoning, and produced alarming levels
of appellate reversals. The Supreme Court’s Markman decision supports a
balanced, structurally sound, legally appropriate, hybrid standard of
appellate review that would promote more accurate, efficient patent dispute
resolution. Under this standard, the Federal Circuit would defer to trial
judges’ factual determinations in claim construction rulings—such as how
a person having ordinary skill in the art would understand technical terms
1
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used in a claim—but would retain de novo authority over whether the trial
court’s factual finding inappropriately overrides more specific intrinsic
indications of the patent’s scope.
AUTHORS—J. Jonas Anderson, Assistant Professor of Law, American
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of Law and Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University
of California at Berkeley School of Law. We thank the Berkeley Center for
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Carlson, David Engstrom, Lynn Pasahow, Matthew Powers, and David
Schwartz for their comments on the coding, methodology, and analysis,
and to an extraordinary team of Berkeley Law students, American
University Law students, and BCLT Fellows for their coding efforts: Ebby
Abraham, Lily Ackerman, Jeremy Bock, Chris Civil, Taràs Czebiniak,
Reza Dokhanchy, Andy Dufresne, Indraneel Ghosh, David Goetz, Amy
Hayden, Asher Hodes, Ryan Iwahashi, Parker Kuhl, Jeff Licitra, Brittany
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INTRODUCTION
Patent claim construction—the process of interpreting patent
boundaries—is central to the operation of the patent system.1 When
patentees seek to enforce their rights in court, the interpretation of patent

1

See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2001) (observing that “[d]etermining the scope of the patent claims is the most
important issue in a patent infringement suit”); Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of
Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (“[T]he
name of the game is the claim.” (emphasis omitted)); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1105, 1119 (2004) (finding that “it is clear that claim construction plays a major—and perhaps the
major—role in patent infringement litigation”); William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and
Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 757 (1948) (observing that “[i]n [the United
States], the claims are regarded as definitions of the invention, rather than mere guides to its scope” and
“are so all-important on the measure of the grant, they are the subject of energetic and often protracted
contest between applicants and examiners in Patent Office proceedings”).
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claim boundaries guides both infringement and validity analysis.2 As a
result, patent prosecutors devote substantial effort to crafting patent claims
that maximize scope while differentiating prior art.3 Businesses seeking to
enter the marketplace must be careful to avoid encroaching patent claims or
risk liability for patent infringement.
Notwithstanding the critical importance of claim boundaries to both
patentees and competitors, the processes and doctrines governing the
construction of patent claims are notoriously amorphous and uncertain. The
United States Patent and Trademark Office devotes relatively little effort to
clarifying patent boundaries in the examination process.4 Thus, when
patentees seek to enforce their patents, the task of claim construction falls
to generalist federal district court judges, few of whom have technical
training or experience with patent law.5
Claim construction’s importance to the patent system has led to a large
body of literature critical of modern claim construction practice.6 Much of

2

Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured
Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 714 (2010).
3
See Woodward, supra note 1.
4
See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 n.19
(2001) (noting estimates that patent examiners devote less than twenty hours, on average, to reviewing
patents).
5
See The Honorable S. Jay Plager, Abolish the Court of Federal Claims? A Question of
Democratic Principle, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791, 797 (2003) (observing that “[m]ost district court
judges do not have scientific training, and most have not chosen law clerks with technical or patent
backgrounds”); cf. Judge James F. Holderman in collaboration with Halley Guren, The Patent
Litigation Predicament in the United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 5 (stating that most
fellow district court judges do not share his enthusiasm for patent cases).
6
See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time
Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 215–86 (2001)
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746–48
(2009) (suggesting that patent law look to central claiming to reduce the uncertainty in claim
construction); Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing
Plain Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1, 8–15 (2002) (proposing increased use of
“plain meaning” in claim construction); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases
Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 237, 300 (2006) (noting the high cost of patent claim construction); Mark A. Lemley, The
Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 118–19 (2005) (arguing that patent
claim terms should have a fixed meaning at the time of the patent application); Mark A. Lemley, The
Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1391–94 (2007) (arguing for limits on
the doctrine of claim differentiation); Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 199–210 (2005) (looking to the patent
specification for claim construction guidance); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation,
14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4, 7–9 (2000) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s hypertextualist jurisprudence,
generally); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61, 83–84
(2006) (proposing a linguistic-based approach to claim construction); Lee Petherbridge, The Claim
Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 218–19 (2008) (describing the
difficulty inherent in the claim construction process); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An

4
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the criticism originates from the high reversal rates of claim construction
appeals—ranging from 35% to 44%.7 One district court judge has observed
that in view of such a high reversal rate, “you might as well throw darts.”8
Numerous scholars have argued that the source of uncertainty in claim
construction is the Federal Circuit itself: the court’s jurisprudence is
difficult to understand and at times contradictory.9 Even the Federal
Circuit’s landmark 2005 decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.,10 which many
viewed as a potential watershed moment, did not appease the critics.
According to the academic studies following Phillips, very little has
changed—the high reversal rate persists and the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction methodology remains unclear.11
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 267
(2008) (finding that experience with claim construction does not improve district court reversal odds).
7
See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (reporting a 44% reversal rate); Kimberly A. Moore,
Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231,
233 (2005) (reporting a 34.5% reversal rate); Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim
Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 232–35 (2007); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim
Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal
Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 745–46 (2003) (reporting a 41.5% reversal rate). But see Jeffrey
A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1033, 1038–39 (2007) (arguing that the patent claim construction reversal rate is not substantially
higher than reversal rates observed in other forms of complex litigation).
8
See Anandashankar Mazumdar, Federal District Courts Need Experts that Are Good ‘Teachers,’
Judges Tell Bar, 70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 536, 537 (Sept. 16, 2005) (quoting
Judge Marsha J. Penchman of the U.S. District Court of Western Washington); see also Ultratech, Inc.
v. Tamarack Scientific Co., No. C 03-03235 CRB, 2005 WL 2562623, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2005)
(“Nor can the Court say that Ultratech’s claim construction position is so frivolous as to warrant
sanctions; to be candid, this Court is reluctant to hold that any claim construction is frivolous, given the
well-known reversal rate in the Federal Circuit.”); The Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel
Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
671, 682 (2004) (noting that some district court judges are “demoralize[d]” by the high reversal rate)
(remarks of Judge Patti Saris). The Federal Circuit has noted the concern. See Merck & Co. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader J., dissenting) (noting that the Federal
Circuit “often hears criticism from district court judges that its reversal rate on claim construction issues
far exceeds that of other circuit courts”).
9
See Bender, supra note 6, at 211, 217; Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1771; Hill & Cote, supra
note 6, at 2; Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 133–46 (2005); Miller, supra note 6, at 182; Kelly Casey
Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 334
(2007); Nard, supra note 6, at 82; Osenga, supra note 6, at 68–73; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note
1.
10
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
11
See Neil E. Graham, Judges Debate Legacy of Phillips: Landmark Ruling or ‘Nothing New’?,
70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 413, 413 (Aug. 5, 2005) (quoting Judge Susan Braden as
characterizing the Phillips decision as “much ado about nothing”); Cheryl Lee Johnson, The Continuing
Inability of Judges to Pass Their Markman Tests: Why the Broken System Leaves Judges Behind,
Confused and Demoralized, in MARKMAN HEARINGS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN PATENT
LITIGATION 2008, at 69, 108 (2008) (declaring that “[w]hat Phillips delivered was disappointment”);
Saunders, supra note 7, at 239 (finding that post-Phillips “reversal rates remain substantially the same”

5
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This Article calls this perception into question based on a
comprehensive empirical analysis of the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction jurisprudence from 2000 through 2011. The data show that the
claim construction reversal rate has dropped significantly since the Phillips
decision: from 38.6% to 25.6% on a per-claim-term basis. The reversal rate
on a per-case basis (i.e., percentage of cases with at least one reversed
claim term) has fallen from 41.8% prior to Phillips to 31.6% following the
decision. During 2009, the reversal rate dipped to 16.5%. The reversal rate
for 2011 was 20.4%. Since Phillips, each Federal Circuit judge has become
more likely to affirm claim construction appeals than he or she was before
the decision. Furthermore, claim construction decisions are now more
likely to be affirmed on appeal across nearly all technologies.
While the Federal Circuit continues to adhere to de novo standard of
review for claim construction rulings,12 our data indicate that Phillips
triggered an era of “informal deference” on the court. Phillips signaled a
softening of the Federal Circuit’s approach to deference even though the
court declined to repudiate the de novo standard expressly. The Federal
Circuit has steadfastly held that it owes no deference to district court claim
construction rulings,13 notwithstanding indications in the Supreme Court’s
1996 Markman decision that claim construction can entail factual
determinations.14 Many judges on the court take issue with that view.15 The
lack of consensus among judges on the Federal Circuit continues to
produce uncertainty and confusion for the patent system. On March 15,
2013, the Federal Circuit granted a petition for en banc review on:
and while Phillips has had “some effect on claim construction reasoning, [it] has not resolved the
underlying disputes and problems with claim construction”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did
Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed.,
2013) (finding that Phillips has done little to ameliorate the methodological disputes on the Federal
Circuit and has “undermined . . . efforts to develop a coherent and predictable jurisprudence”)
(manuscript at 148) (on file with authors).
12
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
13
See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Moore, J., joined by Rader, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
833 (2013); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010); id. at
1363–64 (Clark, District Judge (E.D. Tex.), concurring); Medegen MMS, Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc., 317 F.
App’x 982, 988–91 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Walker, Chief District Judge (N.D. Cal.), dissenting) (urging
greater deference); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
14
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388, 390 (1996) (noting that
“construing a term of art following receipt of evidence” is “a mongrel practice”; claim construction
“falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact”; and “there is sufficient
reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the
normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings”).
15
See, e.g., Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1373 (Moore, J., joined by Rader, C.J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc); id. (O’Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Amgen,
469 F.3d at 1040 (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

6
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(1) whether it should overrule Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,
(2) whether it should “afford deference to any aspect of a district court’s
claim construction,” and (3) “[i]f so, which aspects should be afforded
deference.”16
Our Article provides a way forward for a court torn between a formal
de novo standard of review and a pragmatic, informal, and deferential
standard. The Supreme Court’s Markman decision supports a balanced,
structurally sound, legally appropriate, hybrid standard of appellate review
that would promote more accurate, efficient patent dispute resolution.
Under this standard, the Federal Circuit would defer to trial judges’ factual
determinations in claim construction rulings—such as how a person having
ordinary skill in the art would understand technical terms used in a claim—
but would retain de novo authority over whether the trial court’s factual
finding inappropriately overrides more specific intrinsic indications of the
patent’s scope.
The hybrid standard of appellate review of claim construction rulings
appropriately leverages trial judges’ special ability to develop the
evidentiary record needed to resolve the mixed fact and law controversies
inherent in patent claim construction while enhancing the quality of
appellate review. According greater deference to trial courts through clear
error review of the factual underpinnings of claim construction rulings that
are supported by sound evidentiary processes, properly documented
records, and transparent reasoning would promote more systematic, wellfounded claim construction analysis. Combining this deferential review of
factual findings with de novo review of the overarching claim construction
determination would provide the appropriate appellate safeguard.
We set the stage for our analysis in Part I by tracing the evolution of
patent claim construction jurisprudence from the enactment of patent
protection shortly after the founding of the United States to the present.
Part II describes our empirical methodology and reports key findings with
regard to reversal rates, evidentiary sources, doctrinal patterns, judgespecific patterns, technology patterns, and procedural patterns. Part III
evaluates potential explanations for our empirical results. Part IV provides
a normative analysis of the standard of review for claim construction
rulings. Drawing on the historical and empirical analyses, it contends that
although the shift toward informal deference has been salutary, formal
recognition of a more deferential standard would produce a richer factual
record for claim construction determinations, better grounded decisions,
and more transparent rulings while encouraging earlier settlement of cases.

16

See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 F. App’x 951, 951–52
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Since the Supreme Court’s 1996 Markman decision, claim
construction has taken on a central role in patent case management as a
distinct procedural stage, a tool for facilitating summary judgment, and a
foundation for expert reports.17 To more fully appreciate the modern claim
construction era and as background for our normative analysis, this Part
traces the evolution of patent claim construction.
The formal process of a judge construing patent claims is of relatively
recent vintage and reflects the confluence of four principal factors: (1) the
emergence of patent claiming in the early nineteenth century, (2) the shift
from central claiming to peripheral claiming in the mid- to late nineteenth
century, (3) the shift in infringement jurisprudence toward a focus on claim
boundaries beginning in the late nineteenth century, and (4) the resurgence
of patent jury trials in the 1970s after more than a century of disuse.
A. Early History
1.

1790–1836: The “Invention” and Emergence of Patent
Claims.—The development of claim construction logically begins
with the emergence of patent claiming. As Karl Lutz explained, “nothing in
the nature of a claim had appeared either in British patent practice or in that
of the American states” prior to 1790.18 At its inception in 1790, the U.S.
patent system required:
a specification in writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or
models, and explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or
discovery will admit of a model) of the thing or things, by him or them
invented or discovered, and described as aforesaid, in the said patents.19

There was no requirement that the inventor specifically claim the invention,
and most early patents did not contain formal claims.20 Rather, applicants
focused on describing the invention.21
The 1790 Patent Act was short-lived for several reasons. It tasked the
Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary for the Department of
War, and the Attorney General with personally examining patents, which,

17

See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE ch. 5 (2d ed. 2012).
See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 134
(1938).
19
See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
20
See Lutz, supra note 18, at 134–35; Woodward, supra note 1, at 758.
21
See ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. at 110 (requiring applicants to “distinguish the invention or discovery from
other things before known”); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (requiring applicants to
“distinguish the same from all other things before known”).
18

8
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in light of their other responsibilities, proved untenable.22 Second, inventors
were displeased with the high and vague threshold for protection: that
inventions be deemed “sufficiently useful and important.”23
As a result, in 1793 Congress struck the requirement that inventions be
“sufficiently useful and important” and replaced the examination process
with a registration system,24 leaving the evaluation of patentability entirely
to the courts. The Patent Act of 1793 retained a terse standard for
patentability: an inventor could patent “any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or
used before the application.”25 The inventor was still required to provide a
written description of the invention and the manner of use
in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other
things before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, of
which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make,
compound, and use the same.26

Following this directive and usages growing out of the English statute
and practice on which the U.S. patent system was based, the first American
patents merely described the invention in general terms. According to Lutz,
the “earliest suggestion of the claim . . . was the inclusion in the description
of a statement that the patentee did not intend to be limited to the specific
disclosure of the patent.”27 Such negative limitations would come to be
disfavored in Patent Office guidance.28
Woodward credits Robert Fulton, developer of the first commercially
successful steamboat, with “inventing” the patent claim.29 His 1811 patent
stated:
Having been the first to demonstrate the superior advantages of a water
wheel or wheels, I claim as my exclusive right, the use of two wheels, one
over each side of the boat to take the purchase on the water . . . .30

22

See P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 238, 251
(1936); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson (Apr. 1, 1792), reprinted in 6 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 458, 459 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., fed. ed. 1904).
23
Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 932, 935–36 (1991) (quoting Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7 § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 100).
24
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
25
See id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 319.
26
See id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 321.
27
Lutz, supra note 18, at 135 (citing a 1799 patent).
28
See id. at 136.
29
See Woodward, supra note 1, at 758 (describing Fulton’s patent granted on February 9, 1811);
accord Lutz, supra note 18, at 137 (commenting that “Fulton can perhaps more properly be credited
with invention of the ‘claim’ than of the steamboat”).
30
See Lutz, supra note 18, at 136–37 (emphasis added).

9
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Although there were sporadic examples in the first two decades of the
nineteenth century of patents expressly claiming inventions, such explicit
claiming was not the general practice.31
Justice Joseph Story, who would emerge as the leading patent jurist of
the first half of the nineteenth century,32 immediately came to see the
problems with vague and conclusory descriptions of inventions. Sitting in
his first patent case (and the first case to focus on the question of
distinguishing a patented invention from the prior art33), he noted the
“intrinsic difficulty . . . to ascertain . . . the exact boundaries between what
was known and used before, and what is new.”34 Justice Story charged the
jury that if the plaintiff did not invent “the whole machine” and only
contributed “an improvement,” the plaintiff’s patent must be deemed “too
broad” and “utterly void” because it was “clearly a patent for the whole
machine.”35 Justice Story explicated this principle more fully four years
later, charging the jury that:
A patent is grantable only for a new and useful invention; and, unless it be
distinctly stated, in what that invention specifically consists, it is impossible to
say, whether it ought to be patented or not; and it is equally difficult to know,
whether the public infringe upon or violate the exclusive right secured by the
patent.36

The early judicial focus on patent clarity was directed to the question
of patent validity—whether the specification adequately described the
invention “in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same
from all other things before known”37—as opposed to patent infringement.38
In 1822, the Supreme Court in Evans v. Eaton upheld the trial court’s
decision invalidating Evans’s patent for failure to distinguish his
improvement from the prior art:

31

See id. at 138.
See Peter S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and Ramifications
for Statutory Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 11, at
72–73 & n.65; Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 AM. J.
LEG. HIST. 254 (1961).
33
See Lutz, supra note 18, at 138.
34
See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,601); see also
Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) (noting the “intrinsic
difficulty”).
35
See Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1123.
36
See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
37
See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321.
38
See Woodward, supra note 1, at 760 (explaining that “the courts for a long time did not regard
the particular formulations chosen by the inventor to express his claim and distinguish his invention
from the prior art as the definitive measure of the scope of the patent”).
32
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We do not say that the party is bound to describe the old machine; but we are
of opinion that he ought to describe what his own improvement is, and to limit
his patent to such improvement.39

Consequently, patent drafters began to include formal patent claims at
the end of their applications for the purpose of avoiding invalidation on the
ground of defective specification.40 In 1828, Dr. Thomas P. Jones, the
Superintendent of the Patent Office, published an article entitled
“Information to Persons Applying for Patents, or Transacting Other
Business at the Patent Office,” instructing applicants that:
No more must be claimed in the patent, than what is new, and is the
invention, or discovery, of the patentee.
Many patents have been vacated, in consequence of inattention to this last
rule. In the specification it is perfectly proper to describe an entire machine,
although most parts of it may have been long known and used, as, otherwise,
it may be difficult to make known the improvements; but after doing this, the
patentee should distinctly set forth what he claims as new; and this is best
done in a separate paragraph, at the end of the specification . . . .41

Thus, by the late 1820s, it had become common practice for patent
applicants to include a formal designation of the claimed invention in a
separate paragraph at the end of the specification.42
2.

1836–1870: The Rise and Fall of Central Claiming, the Shift to
Bench Trials, and the Emergence of Peripheral Claims as the
Measure of Patent Scope.—The lack of an examination system
eroded faith in the patent system due to the proliferation of “unrestrained
and promiscuous grants of patent privileges.”43 In response, the Patent Act
of 1836 reinstituted examination in a newly constituted Patent Office and
encouraged claiming conventions that grew out of jurisprudence44 by
requiring applicants to “particularly specify and point out the part,

39

20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 435 (1822); see also Isaacs v. Cooper, 13 F. Cas. 153, 154 (C.C.D Pa.
1821) (No. 7096) (denying relief on the ground that “the nature of the improvement is altogether
unintelligible”).
40
See N.J. Brumbaugh, History and Purpose of Claims in United States Patent Law, 14 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y 273, 276–77 (1932); Lutz, supra note 18, at 139–40.
41
See Thomas P. Jones, Information to Persons Applying for Patents, or Transacting Other
Business at the Patent Office, 6 FRANKLIN J. & AM. MECHANICS’ MAG. 332, 334 (1828).
42
See Brumbaugh, supra note 40, at 276 (observing that patent practitioners had “almost
universally” been claiming their inventions in the years leading up to the 1836 Act).
43
See JOHN RUGGLES, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE PATENT OFFICE, S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 4 (1836).
44
See Brumbaugh, supra note 40, at 276 (commenting that the 1836 Act “merely endorsed and
positively required what inventors had been doing voluntarily for years”).
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improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or
discovery.”45
The form of patent claiming that emerged during this period—which
has come to be known as “central” claiming—differs substantially from the
“peripheral” format in common usage today. Furthermore, the prevalence
of patent jury trials increased substantially during the mid-nineteenth
century. The early claiming format responded to the invalidation of
overbroad claiming identified in such cases as Whittemore v. Cutter and
Evans v. Eaton by using “reference characters”—alpha-numeric labels for
patent drawings—to specify particular structural components illustrating
their improvement.46 The Patent Office’s Rules of Practice as late as 1869
recommended use of reference characters in patent claims.47
Aside from the format in which claims were written, claims from this
era differed from modern practice in their application and importance at
trial. Claims were not used during this era as the basis for assessing patent
infringement. The early infringement standard measured the accused device
against the entirety of the patent, sometimes with reference to the
patentee’s actual device, using a substantial identity test.48 The courts only
gradually and episodically came to see the importance of claim boundaries
in evaluating patent infringement.49
Thus, even though most patent cases were tried to juries through the
mid-nineteenth century, claim construction was relatively limited and
largely fell outside of the jury’s role.50 Infringement focused on the
operative principle of the invention as set forth in the specification and the
patentee’s device. As Lutz described:
As time went on complete control of the interpretation of patent documents
was gradually transferred to the judge. When it became apparent that the jury
was not equal to the task, the custom developed of having the judge include in
his charge to the jury a detailed interpretation of the patent coupled with

45

See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (emphasis added); see also Lutz, supra note
18, at 143 (“This addition to the statute had no immediate effect on the form or substance of claims
because it was understood as merely codifying the existing law which had been developed by the
courts.”).
46
See RIDSDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS §§ 3–5 (1949).
47
See id. § 5.
48
See Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) (Story, J.)
(instructing the jury to determine infringement based on substantiality); GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
§ 220, at 262 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1849) (“An infringement involves substantial
identity, whether that identity is described by the terms, ‘same principle,’ same modus operandi, or any
other.”); Woodward, supra note 1, at 760.
49
See Wyeth v. Stone 30 F. Cas. 723, 727–28 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107) (Story, J.); Lutz,
supra note 18, at 145; Woodward, supra note 1, at 760–65.
50
See Lutz, supra note 18, at 143 (observing that “[f]or approximately the first twenty years
[following 1836] all infringement cases continued to be tried at law before a jury”).
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instructions that his interpretation was binding on the jury. Another
contributing influence was the increasing reliance of the patentees on the
growing equity power of the courts, a practice which necessitated interpreting
the patent on applications for injunctions, and which finally gave the judge
complete equity jurisdiction of infringement cases.51

Thus, claim construction was relatively limited and largely outside of the
jury’s purview during this era.
Even before the 1836 Act, some applicants began using a more radical
claiming format that would come to be known as “peripheral” claiming.52
These claims used linguistic formulations, rather than references to specific
improvements, to delineate the metes and bounds of the claimed invention.
3.

1870–1970: The Rise of Peripheral Claiming, Shift in the Role of
Claims in Infringement Analysis, and Decline of Patent Jury
Trials.—The Patent Act of 1870 formalized use of patent claims
by requiring applicants to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the
part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or
discovery.”53 Claims were already in universal use by that time. Of greater
importance is the dramatic shift from central to peripheral claiming. As
illustrated in Table 1, that transformation was almost entirely complete by
the turn of the twentieth century, laying the foundation for the system of
peripheral claiming and the multiplicity of claims per patent that
predominates today.
TABLE 1: EVOLUTION OF CLAIM PRACTICE54
Year of
Percentage of Claims Having
Average Number
Issue of Patents
Reference Characters
of Claims
1860
73%*
1.3
1880
82%*
3.3
1900
22%
7.7
1920
0%
7.2
1940
0%
6.9
*Many of the claims not having reference characters were process claims.

Several institutions and factors contributed to this dramatic
transformation in the nature of patent claiming. Although some
commentators cite the passage of the 1870 Act as the major precipitating
51

See id.
See, e.g., Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 313–14, (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 17,214)
(quoting from a patent for “a new and useful improvement in the method of planing, tonguing,
grooving, and cutting into mouldings” registered in 1828); R. CARL MOY, 1 MOY’S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 4:2, at 4-18 to -20 (4th ed. 2006).
53
See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (emphasis added).
54
See ELLIS, supra note 46, § 6.
52
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factor,55 the Patent Office had already begun the push toward peripheral
claiming well before that date. As Lutz describes,56 the Patent Office issued
a series of pamphlets—including “Guide to Practice of the Patent Office”
in 1852 and “Rules and Directions for Proceedings in the Patent Office” in
1862 and 1863—refining claiming practice and advocating greater
specificity.57 Under the leadership of Commissioner Samuel Sparks Fisher,
the Patent Office began publishing the Commissioner’s decisions in
January 1869.58 Building on this effort, the Patent Office would begin
publishing the Official Gazette, a weekly journal, in 1872.59 Brumbaugh
explains that “[t]hese decisions . . . show[] the beginning of the present
practice of the office with reference to the positive inclusion of elements in
a claim.”60
It is evident from these first published decisions that the Patent Office
sought more detailed and clear articulation of patent claims. In Ex parte
Rubens, Commissioner Fisher expressed:
The claim should state all the elements of the combination intended to be
patented, and if the parts are the same in name and number as in some prior
machine, and the improvement consists in some modification of one or more
of those parts, the claim should distinctly state that modification.61

Other decisions from this transformative period upheld claims lacking
reference characters,62 permitted “genus claiming,”63 and signaled
receptivity to multiple claims in stating that “claims in different forms . . .
prevent misconstructions.”64
The courts also played a critical role in the shift toward peripheral
claiming, although the dramatic change of judicial course followed rather
55

See, e.g., Nard, supra note 6, at 13 n.50; Joseph S. Cianfrani, An Economic Analysis of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 13 (1997), available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol1/
issue/vol1_art1.pdf.
56
See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 457 (1938).
57
Id. at 464–66, 487–88.
58
See William Edgar Simonds, Preface to A DIGEST OF PATENT OFFICE DECISIONS, 1869–1879, at
v (William Edgar Simonds ed., Washington, D.C., W.H. & O.H. Morrison 1880); Biographical
Sketches of the Commissioners of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y (CENTENNIAL NUMBER) 145, 174
(1936) (“[Col. Fisher’s] decisions were so illuminating, logical and concise as to necessarily compel
attention.”).
59
See Legislative Changes Since 1836, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y (CENTENNIAL NUMBER) 103, 115
(1936).
60
See Brumbaugh, supra note 40, at 283; see also Woodward, supra note 1, at 764 (reporting that
“[w]hen in 1866 a program was adopted for printing all specifications, including those of patents issued
since 1836, the plan provided for putting the separate clauses of the claiming part into separate
numbered paragraphs, to conform with the practice that had in the meanwhile become general”).
61
See Ex parte Charles Rubens & Co., 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 107, 108.
62
See Ex parte Continental Windmill Co., 1870 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 74, 75.
63
See Ex parte Eagle, 1870 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 137, 137.
64
See Ex parte Perry & Lay, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 1, 1.
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than led the Patent Office’s efforts. During the period when central
claiming predominated, courts did not view claim language as a restriction
on a patent’s scope.65 Rather, courts used claims as well as the specification
to ascertain the patent’s underlying inventive principle, which provided the
baseline for evaluating whether the defendant’s device embodied this
principle, either identically or in a substantially equivalent manner.66
This approach to determining infringement reached its apogee in the
Supreme Court’s 1853 decision in Winans v. Denmead,67 which applied this
doctrine of equivalents. Writing for a narrow majority of the Court, Justice
Benjamin Curtis reversed the trial judge on the ground that the defendants’
rail cars were “substantially the same” “structure,” “mode of operation,”
and “result.”68 The court focused not on the wording of the claim, but rather
on what it considered to be the substance of the invention: the “new mode
of operation.”69 The majority pointedly downplayed the role of claim
language in restricting patent scope.70
Justice Campbell, joined by three other members of the Court,
dissented in an opinion emphasizing the need for patents to provide clear
notice of their boundaries to the public.71 “Fulness, clearness, exactness,
preciseness, and particularity, in the description of the invention, its
principle, and of the matter claimed to be invented, will alone fulfil the
demands of Congress or the wants of the country” in promoting
competition and innovation.72 In the dissent’s view, the “language of the
patent is full, clear, and exact. The claim is particular and specific. Neither
the specification nor the claim . . . embrace the workmanship of the
defendants.”73

65

See Lutz, supra note 18, at 147 (explaining that “claims rarely, if ever, received consideration on
the question of infringement” prior to 1870); but cf. Woodward, supra note 1, at 760 (noting that as
early as 1831, a few courts “expressed that the claims of a patent might bind the patentee against
assertion of a broader scope for the patent on the question of infringement”).
66
See, e.g., Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723, 728 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107) (Story, J.)
(instructing jury that patentee is not “bound down to any precise form of words”); Odiorne v. Winkley,
18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432) (Story, J.) (stating in charging the jury that “[t]he
material question, therefore, is not whether the same elements of motion, or the same component parts
are used, but whether the given effect is produced substantially by the same mode of operation, and the
same combination of powers, in both machines”); CURTIS, supra note 48 (explaining the principle of
“substantial identity” in patent infringement cases).
67
56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
68
Id. at 338–41.
69
Id. at 341.
70
See id. at 343 (holding that a patent extends beyond the words of the claim to “every form in
which his invention may be copied”).
71
See id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 347–48.
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The Campbell dissent’s view ultimately prevailed. In two 1877
Supreme Court decisions—Merrill v. Yeomans74 and Keystone Bridge Co.
v. Phoenix Iron Co.75—the Supreme Court embraced patent law’s public
notice function by linking the scope of patent protection to the metes and
bounds set forth in patent claims. This contributed to the decline of central
claiming76 and eventually made claim construction an essential step in
infringement analysis. In a watershed passage in Merrill, the Court
explained the critical role of clearly identifiable patent boundaries for
technological and economic advance:
The genius of the inventor, constantly making improvements in existing
patents—a process which gives to the patent system its greatest value,—
should not be restrained by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims in
existing patents from the salutary and necessary right of improving on that
which has already been invented. It seems to us that nothing can be more just
and fair, both to the patentee and to the public, than that the former should
understand, and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for what he
claims a patent.77

The patent claim quickly emerged as the defining feature of the
patent.78 In his seminal 1890 treatise, William C. Robinson characterized it
as “the office of the Claim to define the limits of that exclusive use which
is secured to the inventor by the patent”;79 “[t]he Claim is thus the life of
the patent so far as the rights of the inventor are concerned.”80 This shift
brought claim construction to a prominent role in patent litigation. As
Robinson explained, “The paramount importance of the Claim, and the
necessity for such exactness and completeness in its statements as will
precisely define the invention to be protected by the patent, have led to the
establishment of numerous rules for framing it.”81
Regarding the allocation of responsibility for construing patent claims,
Robinson recognized that “[t]he duty of interpreting letters-patent has been

74

94 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1876).
95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877).
76
See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1142–45 (2008) (Lefstin cites Merrill as establishing the foundation for
“[a]n ordered and logical system of patent law” based on “an ordered and logical system for defining
patent rights. The system of peripheral claiming, in which the claims set forth the boundaries of the
patent, served both ends.”).
77
See Merrill, 94 U.S. at 573–74.
78
See Burns v. Meyer, 100 U.S. 671, 672 (1879) (“The courts, therefore, should be careful not to
enlarge, by construction, the claim which the Patent Office has admitted, and which the patentee has
acquiesced in, beyond the fair interpretation of its terms.”).
79
See 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 504, at 110
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890).
80
See id. § 505, at 111.
81
See id. § 507, at 115.
75
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committed to the courts.”82 He cited the 1845 case of Emerson v. Hogg,83
where the court found error in delegating a question of construction to the
jury.84 Robinson based this allocation of responsibility on the principle that
the courts have primacy in interpreting legal instruments.85 Following the
court in Emerson v. Hogg and other authority,86 Robinson characterized
patent interpretation as a “question[] of law.”87 He justified this treatment
on the functional consideration that:
To treat the nature of the patented invention as a matter of fact, to be inquired
of and determined by a jury, would at once deprive the inventor of the
opportunity to obtain a permanent and universal definition of his rights under
the patent, and in each case of infringement it would subject him to the danger
of a false interpretation, from the consequences of which he could not escape.
By confiding this duty to the court, however, its decision as to the nature of
the patented invention becomes reviewable to the same extent as any other
legal question, and when his patent has received the interpretation of the
Supreme Court of the United States the inventor can maintain his privilege, as
thus interpreted, against all opponents without further controversy in reference
to its true limitations.88

Notwithstanding the characterization of claim construction as a
“question of law,” Robinson nonetheless recognized that:
In its interpretation of a patent the court may have recourse to any testimony
to explain the meaning of its language, or to expert evidence to ascertain the
essential characteristics of the described invention and the differences between
it and other patented inventions, or to papers in the Patent Office which are
connected with the patent or whose contents were known to the inventor at the
date of his application, to show the significance which he attached to the terms
that he employed. But of whatever aid the courts avail themselves, their
interpretation must be based upon the patent as it stands, and when its scope is

82

See id. § 732, at 481.
8 F. Cas. 628 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1845) (No. 4440), aff’d, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437 (1848).
84
See id. at 631 (“It is the province and the duty of the court to settle the meaning of the
patent . . . .”).
85
See ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 732, at 481; see also id. § 733, at 483 n.1 (“There is great reason
and importance for this distribution of the respective duties of the court and the jury. The import of the
instrument is purely a question of law. The interpretation of complicated instruments of writing is a
special occupation, requiring, like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his training
and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury . . . . The
action of a judge, in such a case as that of interpreting the specification, is moreover open to review and
correction, by reconsideration on his part, or by the revisal of a superior or appellate court . . . .”
(quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 10,740))).
86
8 F. Cas. at 631; Nat’l Car-Brake Shoe Co. v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg. Co., 19 F. 514 (C.C.D.
Ind. 1884).
87
See ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 732, at 482.
88
See id. § 733, at 483–84.
83
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once fairly apparent it can neither be limited nor extended by extraneous
evidence.89

Thus, the nature of claim construction had a distinctive character, which the
Supreme Court would later describe as a “mongrel” practice—a legal
question based on underlying factual determinations reserved,
notwithstanding the Seventh Amendment, to the trial judge.90
Although Merrill and Keystone Bridge Co. contributed to the
centrality of claim restrictions in defining a patent’s scope, claim drafting
and claim construction continued to evolve over the next century.91 It was
quite common for courts to integrate their judgment about an inventor’s
contribution to the art into their evaluation of a patent’s scope.92 Judge
Learned Hand would later remark: “No doubt the interpretation of patent
claims depends more upon the advance made by the inventor than upon the
words used, and in spite of protestations to the contrary, courts do at times
play fast and loose with them as they do not with other formal
documents.”93 Writing sixty years after the Supreme Court’s Merrill
decision, Lutz would state that “[t]he controversy as to whether the claim
should be taken as a literal ‘definition’ of the invention persists to this
day.”94
4. 1970–1995: The Resurgence of Patent Jury Trials.—By the
1970s, the shift toward construing patent scope based on claim restrictions
reached full fruition.95 Largely coincidental with the ascendancy of the
patent claim as a touchstone for determining patent scope, claim
construction became subsumed in judicial deliberations as a result of the
shift away from patent jury trials. The 1870 Act granted equity courts the
power to award common law damages in patent cases,96 prompting litigants
to favor bench trials.97 By 1940, the first year in which statistics on the
89

See 3 ROBINSON, supra note 79, § 1019, at 248 (footnote omitted).
See infra Part I.B.1.
91
See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive Community”:
A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 348–62 (2008).
92
See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) (stating that the
apparent conflict between strictly construing patent claims and finding equivalents could be explained
by courts’ “differing attitude . . . toward genuine discoveries and slight improvements”).
93
Cole v. Malleable Iron Fittings Co., 70 F.2d 686, 687 (2d Cir. 1934); see also Gen. Motors Corp.
v. Kesling, 164 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1947) (“Broad as is the language of these Claims, their scope
depends upon the discovery revealed in the explanatory Specifications.”).
94
See Lutz, supra note 56, at 474.
95
See Paeco, Inc. v. Applied Moldings, Inc., 562 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Where the
language of a patent claim is clear, the court need not—and may not —go beyond the claim to the
specification.”); Maclaren v. B-I-W Grp. Inc., 535 F.2d 1367, 1372 (2d Cir. 1976) (declaring the
claim’s role in defining patent scope as “fundamental”); Golden, supra note 91, at 360–61.
96
See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 198, 206.
97
See Lutz, supra note 56, at 470 (“After 1870 patentees resorted to actions at law with decreasing
frequency until finally the jurisdiction of equity over infringement suits became for all practical
90
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percentage of jury trials by subject matter were compiled by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, only 2.5% of patent
trials were heard by juries.98 The percentage of patent jury trials remained
low—just a few per year—and never exceeded 10% until the mid-1970s.99
As reflected in Figure 1, patent jury trials grew steadily beginning in
the mid-1970s.100 The reasons for preferring trial by jury included speedier
decisions,101 jurors’ willingness to accord greater significance to a patent’s
presumption of validity, dispensing with post-trial briefs and proposed
findings, greater emphasis on excluding inadmissible evidence, and
possibly appellate courts’ reluctance to disturb jury decisions.102 On the
other side of the balance, juries have less capacity to comprehend complex
issues in patent trials, jury trials can be more time-consuming, reversals of
jury trials usually require new trials (whereas a judge can merely alter
findings), and a patentee’s request for a jury trial could be perceived as a
sign of a weak patent.103

purposes exclusive. This development gave to the equity judges full power of interpreting the patent
instrument.”); Gary M. Ropski, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of the Use of Juries in Patent
Litigation (Part I), 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 609, 609–10 (1976) (speculating that patent trial attorneys
“believed that the fantastic pace of technological development began to exceed the ability of the lay
juror in an action at law to comprehend many inventions”).
98
See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 109 tbl.8 (1941).
99
See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366–67 & fig.1 (2000).
100
Figure 1 is compiled from the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 98, at 108–09 tbl.8, and later years. The number of
patent trials per year varied from a high of 201 in 1941 to a low of 56 in 1946. The number has been
relatively steady at about 100 patent trials per year since 1980.
101
Judges in bench trials could take months to resolve the matter following the close of evidence,
whereas jury verdicts are issued within a few days of closing arguments.
102
See Ropski, supra note 97, at 612–13; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s
Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 852 (2002) (noting that juries may be more favorably inclined
toward patentees, “individuals over large corporations, domestic over foreign” enterprises, and local, instate parties over out-of-state companies).
103
See Ropski, supra note 97, at 612–13.
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF PATENT JURY TRIALS
(1940–2011)

Empirical research validates the instincts of the intrepid trial lawyers
who ventured into litigating patent cases before juries. Using a database of
patents litigated from early 1989 through 1996, Professors Allison and
Lemley found that juries were more likely to favor patentees on patent
validity—i.e., less likely to second-guess Patent Office decisions—than
judges.104 They also found that the Federal Circuit overturned jury verdicts
slightly less frequently than bench trial decisions (13.3% versus 16.2%).105
Using a database of tried patent cases from 1983 to 1999, then-Professor
Moore found that juries ruled “for the patent holder more often on validity,
infringement, and willfulness issues” and awarded higher damages than
judges.106
By 1995, approximately 75% of patent cases were tried to juries. In
most of those cases, trial judges did not construe the patent themselves but
rather instructed the jury on claim construction.107 One effect of this
practice was to shroud the jury’s claim construction in the black box of jury
104

See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 211–16 (1998).
105
See id. at 242–43.
106
See Moore, supra note 99, at 408.
107
See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1238 (1994).
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deliberations, making jury patent decisions especially difficult to review.
This problem precipitated major changes in patent case management.
B. The Emergence of Modern Claim Construction Standards
The resurgence of patent jury trials in the 1970s brought the allocation
of claim construction responsibilities to center stage. During its first decade
of operation, the Federal Circuit generated two arguably inconsistent lines
of authority regarding the nature of claim construction determinations. One
set of cases viewed the interpretation of patent claims as purely a question
of law and hence outside of the jury’s responsibility.108 Another line of
cases characterized claim construction as a mixed question of law based on
underlying factual determinations.109 In this second line of cases, the
Federal Circuit generally permitted trial judges to instruct the jury on
standards for claim construction.110 As a result, district courts routinely
delegated claim construction to the jury.111 This insulated trial verdicts from
reversal as the Federal Circuit would uphold the determination if
substantial evidence supported the jury’s claim interpretation in view of the
sources in the record.112
In an article published in 1994, Federal Circuit Judge Paul Michel
expressed that he could not recall a single jury trial “in which the trial
judge defined the literal scope of the claim for the jury in clear,
comprehensive, and mandatory instructions.”113 He lamented that “[w]hen
the court delegates both construction and infringement to the jury’s
discretion, the jury is free to do almost anything it wishes.”114 Judge Michel
noted that the Federal Circuit would soon take up the wisdom of this
approach to construing patent claims in an en banc case. The Markman
case115 would initiate a jurisprudential roller coaster that continues to this
day.
108

See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118–22, 1138–40 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (en banc); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569–71 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 770–71 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (five-judge panel); SSIH
Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (five-judge panel) (resting
on the authority of Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853)).
109
See Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1549
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985); McGill Inc. v. John
Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666, 671–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
110
See Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 287–88 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823
F.2d 1510, 1515–17 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Data Line Corp. v. Micro Techs., Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1200–02
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument that the trial court was required to determine the scope and
construction of the claim).
111
See Michel, supra note 107.
112
See Snellman, 862 F.2d at 286; Data Line Corp., 813 F.2d at 1200; Vieau, 823 F.2d at 1515.
113
See Michel, supra note 107.
114
See id. at 1239.
115
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S.
370 (1996).
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1.

The Markman Crossroads: Claim Construction Is a Matter
“Exclusively Within the Province of the Court.”—In Markman v.
Westview Instruments, the jury found infringement of a patent for an
“Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores” after
hearing expert testimony about the meaning of the term “inventory” as used
in the patent claim.116 On post-trial motions, the judge overturned the jury’s
verdict, explaining that the expert’s testimony regarding the definition of
“inventory” conflicted with “the ordinary and customary meaning of [this
term], as well as the obvious meaning intended by the patentee, determined
from the specifications, the drawings and the file histories of the original
patent and the patent-in-suit.”117 In upholding the district court’s judgment,
a majority of the Federal Circuit sitting en banc concluded that the
construction of patent claims is properly “a matter of law” that should not
be given to the jury because of the “fundamental principle of American law
that ‘the construction of a written evidence is exclusively with the
court.’”118 The court grounded its determination on its reading of Supreme
Court precedents and authorities dating back to the nineteenth century and
patent law’s notice function: “[I]t is only fair (and statutorily required) that
competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the
patentee’s right to exclude.”119 The majority concluded that “[b]ecause
claim construction is a matter of law, the construction given the claims is
reviewed de novo on appeal.”120
The majority opinion noted that a district court could, “in its
discretion, receive extrinsic evidence in order ‘to aid the court in coming to
a correct conclusion’ as to the ‘true meaning of the language employed’ in
the patent.”121 Nonetheless, it emphasized that while such evidence can be
used “for the court’s understanding of the patent,” it may not be used “for
the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the claims.”122 In an
effort to defeat Markman’s Seventh Amendment challenge, the majority
masked the inherent factual nature of claim construction in the context of
controverted extrinsic evidence in instructing that although the trial judge
may use
certain extrinsic evidence that the court finds helpful and reject[] other
evidence as unhelpful, and resolv[e] disputes en route to pronouncing the
meaning of claim language as a matter of law based on the patent documents
themselves, the court is not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or
making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, the court is looking to the
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
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See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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extrinsic evidence to assist in its construction of the written document, a task
it is required to perform.123

This self-contradictory statement—using some extrinsic evidence and
rejecting other extrinsic evidence but not crediting evidence or making
factual evidentiary findings—generated vehement responses from Judges
Mayer and Newman. Judge Mayer accused the majority of “jettison[ing]
more than two hundred years of jurisprudence and eviscerat[ing] the role of
the jury preserved by the Seventh Amendment.”124 He emphasized the need
to evaluate claims from the standpoint of the skilled artisan, which
naturally brings extrinsic evidence into play.125 Where such evidence is
contested, claim construction requires fact-finding to resolve the
controversy.126
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Federal Circuit’s
determination that “the construction of a patent, including terms of art
within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”127 It did so,
however, in a manner that sidestepped the standard of appellate review,
focusing instead on whether the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment mandates that the jury decide factual disputes arising in patent
claim construction. The Court applied its “historical test”128—determining
first whether the cause of action (patent infringement) was tried at law at
the nation’s founding (or was analogous to one that was), and if so, whether
“the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the
substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.”129
The Court characterized the “construing a term of art following receipt
of evidence” as a “mongrel practice,”130 “fall[ing] somewhere between a
pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact”131 without an “exact
antecedent” in 1791.132 It recognized that patent claims had not yet taken
root in British and American patent practice, finding the closest analogue to
claim construction to be interpretation of patent specifications for which
“the mere smattering of patent cases that we have from this period shows
no established jury practice sufficient to support an argument by analogy
that today’s construction of a claim should be a guaranteed jury issue.”133
123

Id.
Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment).
125
See id. at 991.
126
See id.
127
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
128
Id. at 376 (quoting Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment,
57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640 (1973)).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 378.
131
Id. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
132
Id. at 378.
133
Id. at 379–80 (footnote omitted).
124
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Lacking evidence of common law practice allocating interpretation of
patents to the jury, the Court turned to “the relative interpretive skills of
judges and juries and the statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the
allocation.”134 Applying a functional analysis, the Court came down firmly
on the side of allocating claim construction to the trial judge:
The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges
often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in
exegesis. Patent construction in particular “is a special occupation, requiring,
like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his training and
discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments
than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such a
duty, than a jury can be expected to be.”135

The Court also noted “the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a
given patent as an independent reason to allocate all issues of construction
to the court,” emphasizing the public notice function.136
In a critical passage bearing on the standard of appellate review, the
Court noted that:
It is, of course, true that credibility judgments have to be made about the
experts who testify in patent cases, and in theory there could be a case in
which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to choose between experts
whose testimony was equally consistent with a patent’s internal logic. But our
own experience with document construction leaves us doubtful that trial
courts will run into many cases like that. In the main, we expect, any
credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily
sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard
construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with
the instrument as a whole. Thus, in these cases a jury’s capabilities to evaluate
demeanor, to sense the “mainsprings of human conduct,” or to reflect
community standards, are much less significant than a trained ability to
evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent. The
decisionmaker vested with the task of construing the patent is in the better
position to ascertain whether an expert’s proposed definition fully comports
with the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal
coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat construction
of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the
normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.137

134

Id. at 384.
Id. at 388–89 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (No.
10,740)).
136
Id. at 390.
137
Id. at 389–90 (citations omitted).
135
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Unlike the Federal Circuit’s Markman decision,138 the Supreme Court
avoided characterizing patent claim construction as a “matter of law.”
Rather, consistent with the “mongrel” characterization of claim
construction, the Supreme Court phrased claim construction as a matter
“exclusively within the province of the court.”139
The Markman decision revolutionized patent case management. Trial
judges immediately began experimenting with different procedures for
construing patent claims.140 Within a short time, the concept of the
“Markman hearing” became established and widely used as a pretrial
proceeding to construe patent claims. Holding this hearing in advance of
trial promoted settlement, aided in the development of expert reports, and
provided a basis for summary judgment.141
2.

Post-Markman Confusion Regarding the Nature of Claim
Construction Determinations and the Standard of Appellate
Review.—Barely three months after the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Markman, the Federal Circuit confronted the role of fact-finding in claim
construction in its Vitronics decision.142 The Federal Circuit set forth a
claim construction hierarchy in which courts look first to the intrinsic
evidence: the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution
history, in that order.143 The court noted that “[i]n most situations, an
analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a
disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on
extrinsic evidence.”144 The court cited to its en banc Markman opinion for
the proposition that “where the public record unambiguously describes the
scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is
improper” and warned that “[a]llowing the public record to be altered or
changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony,
would make this right meaningless.”145 Consistent with that approach, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court improperly relied upon
extrinsic evidence “to vary or contradict the manifest meaning of the
claims.”146 The Federal Circuit went further, however, in stating that
“opinion testimony on claim construction should be treated with the utmost

138

See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d,
517 U.S. 370; see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(characterizing claim construction as a “pure issue of law”).
139
Markman, 517 U.S. at 372, 378.
140
See MENELL, supra note 17.
141
See id. chs. 2, 5, 6, 7.
142
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
143
See id. at 1582–83.
144
Id. at 1583.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 1585.
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caution, for it is no better than opinion testimony on the meaning of
statutory terms.”147
In so doing, the court rekindled the self-contradictory statement in its
majority opinion in Markman. District courts could rely on expert
testimony to “understand” the underlying technology but not to reach the
“proper construction” unless “the patent documents, taken as a whole, are
insufficient to enable the court to construe disputed claim terms.”148 This
cautionary language sought to bolster the questionable notion that claim
construction was a pure question of law—a search within the documentary
record—and warned district courts away from hearing from persons skilled
in the art. It diverged from the Supreme Court’s characterization of claim
construction as a “mongrel practice” and its invocation of historical sources
recognizing the need and value for trial courts to consider extrinsic
evidence in determining the meaning of patent claims’ terms to skilled
artisans.149
The Vitronics opinion led district judges away from the use of and
reliance on extrinsic evidence.150 Notwithstanding that few district judges
possess scientific or engineering training or clerks with such backgrounds,
they were expected to master the technological arts to which a patent
pertained as of the time the invention was made without reliance on
experts. Even when they opted for a technology tutorial, trial judges would
do so without putting the evidence on the record. They downplayed or
omitted the experts’ opinions and credibility assessments in their claim
construction decisions.151 Trial judges perceived that “fact-finding” as part
of the Markman process risked running afoul of the Vitronics dictum—that
instances in which the “patent documents, taken as a whole, are insufficient
to enable the court to construe disputed claim terms . . . will rarely, if ever,
occur”152—whereas opaque constructions referencing only intrinsic
147

Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
149
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378–90 (1996).
150
See O’Malley et al., supra note 8, at 683 (noting that some judges believe that “Vitronics says I
cannot listen to an expert, and that is what I think the law is”) (remarks of Judge O’Malley).
151
See Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333 n.7 (D. Del. 1995)
(Schwartz, J.) (“When two experts testify differently as to the meaning of a technical term, and the
court embraces the view of one, the other, or neither while construing a patent claim as a matter of law,
the court has engaged in weighing evidence and making credibility determinations. . . . But when the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals states that the trial court does not do something that the trial court
does and must do to perform the judicial function, that court knowingly enters a land of sophistry and
fiction.”); In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1359
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation) (“[J]udges should not pretend that all nominally
‘legal’ issues may be resolved without reference to facts. . . . What seems clear to a judge may read
otherwise to [one skilled in the art].”).
152
See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. Although the Federal Circuit later clarified that its Vitronics
decision did not bar use of extrinsic evidence to understand the technology and was merely a warning
not to contradict clear intrinsic evidence, see Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 182 F.3d
148
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evidence stood a better chance of affirmance. Following the frustrating
experience of conducting a Markman hearing without the ability to make
factual determinations, district courts faced the prospect of de novo review
by the Federal Circuit.
This predicament produced an alarming reversal rate for district court
claim construction rulings. Then-Professor (now-Federal Circuit Judge)
Kimberly Moore discovered that in the eight years following the Supreme
Court’s Markman decision, the Federal Circuit found errors in 34.5% of the
claim construction terms that it reviewed and at least one claim
construction error in 37.5% of all claim construction appeals.153 Because
claim construction errors often result in district court decisions being
reversed or vacated,154 the ramifications for district judges and litigants are
significant.
This pattern demoralized federal district judges.155 One district judge,
reflecting on his success on appeal, stated:
I have had nine of my cases appealed to the Federal Circuit. I have been
affirmed in one. I have been affirmed in part in one. And I have been reversed
in seven. That does not relieve me—and I am not proud of that. I don’t throw
that out as a challenge to anyone—far from it. My duty is to predict what they
are going to say and follow the law. But I haven’t had noticeable success in
dealing with these matters.156

Division among Federal Circuit judges regarding the appropriate
standard of appellate review continued to surface following the Supreme
Court’s Markman decision.157 Judge Mayer, in particular, continued to press
1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999), district judges continued to downplay their use of and reliance upon
extrinsic evidence in construing patent claims.
153
See Moore, supra note 7, at 239.
154
See Moore, supra note 1, at 4, 13 (reporting, for the five years following the Supreme Court’s
Markman decision, that the Federal Circuit reversed or vacated the district court’s decision in 81% of
cases in which it found a claim construction error).
155
See Mazumdar, supra note 8 (District Judge Marsha Penchman noted: “[When y]ou get
reversed 37 percent of [the] time [on claim construction]; you might as well throw darts.”); Moore,
supra note 99, at 396 (Judge Samuel B. Kent of the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas,
commented at a summary judgment proceeding: “Frankly, I don’t know why I’m so excited about
trying to bring this thing [patent suit] to closure. It goes to the Federal Circuit afterwards. You know,
it’s hard to deal with things that are ultimately resolved by people wearing propeller hats. But we’ll just
have to see what happens when we give it to them. I could say that with impunity because they’ve
reversed everything I’ve ever done, so I expect fully they’ll reverse this, too.”); O’Malley et al., supra
note 8 (quoting Judge Patti Saris of the U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, as stating that
“the high reversal rate demoralizes many federal district court judges”).
156
Honorable William G. Young & R. Carl Moy, Panel Discussion, High Technology Law in the
Twenty-First Century: Second Annual High Technology Law Conference, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 13, 19 (1997) (citation omitted).
157
Compare Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (characterizing
claim construction as a “mixed question of law and fact”), abrogated by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), with id. at 940 (Lourie, J., concurring) (noting that the
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the view that the Federal Circuit owed deference to district court claim
construction rulings,158 eventually precipitating the Federal Circuit’s en
banc review of the appellate claim construction standard in Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Technologies, Inc.159
In a sharply divided decision, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that claim
construction is purely a legal issue, subject to de novo appellate review.
Writing for the majority, Judge Archer read the Supreme Court’s Markman
decision to classify claim constructing as “a legal question to be decided by
the judge.”160 He emphasized the Supreme Court’s concern for certainty
and national uniformity161 and bolstered his conclusion by negative
implication: “Nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion supports the view
that the Court endorsed a silent, third option—that claim construction may
involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact.”162 Judge Archer
downplayed the Supreme Court’s characterization of claim construction as
a “mongrel practice”163 “fall[ing] somewhere between a pristine legal
standard and a simple historical fact,”164 as merely “prefatory comments.”165
He latched on to the Supreme Court’s ambiguous observation that
Supreme Court did not overrule the de novo review standard); see also J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste &
Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“This court’s role in reviewing
claim meanings discerned by the district courts calls for modesty and restraint—born not of timidity,
but of recognition of the limits inherent in appellate review.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555–56 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court correctly consulted
extrinsic evidence and that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate this extrinsic evidence),
abrogated by Cybor, 138 F.3d 1448; id. at 1563 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (arguing that extrinsic evidence
should not be used to contradict the specification and that the “appellate court is equally well suited to
read the specification” as the district court).
158
See Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., concurring)
(arguing that “this court may be required to give due deference to the trial court’s factual findings”
(citing Metaullics Sys. Co., 100 F.3d at 939)); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 120 F.3d 1260,
1261–62 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing and suggestion for rehearing
en banc) (contending that “[t]he Supreme Court in no way suggested that, where the district court found
facts about the prior art or the skill and understanding of an artisan, the appellate panel could disregard
these findings upon de novo review” and asserting that where a question of law is “informed by the
resolution of factual disputes, we must separate the two and give each its proper measure of respect”);
Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Mayer, J., concurring)
(stating that “when, as here, there is vigorous dispute and conflicting evidence about the meaning of a
term, the trial judge has to make findings of fact as he decides the meaning to ascribe to the patent”),
abrogated by Cybor, 138 F.3d 1448.
159
138 F.3d 1448; Donald R. Dunner & Howard A. Kwon, Cybor Corp v. FAS Technologies: The
Final Say on Appellate Review of Claim Construction?, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 481,
489–90 (1998) (noting the “extraordinary” sua sponte order to hear the Cybor case en banc before a
panel decision issued).
160
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455.
161
See id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996)).
162
Id.
163
Markman, 517 U.S. at 378.
164
Id. at 388 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
165
See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455.
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while credibility determinations theoretically could play a role in claim
construction, the chance of such an occurrence is “doubtful” and that “any
credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily
sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard
construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with
the instrument as a whole.”166

Chief Judge Mayer, joined by Judge Newman, reiterated his
longstanding view that the Federal Circuit must defer to the trial judge on
the resolution of disputed factual issues that arise in claim construction.167
Judge Rader dissented from the majority’s pronouncements on claim
interpretation, noting that the Federal Circuit had been so preoccupied with
the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to claim construction that it
had never squarely confronted the standard of appellate review of judgedetermined claim construction rulings.168 He openly questioned the
ramifications of the court’s claim construction guidance for transparency in
the trial court’s record and reasoning, worrying that the de novo standard
would discourage and delay settlement.169
The Cybor decision did little to quell concerns about de novo appellate
review of claim construction rulings.170 Just as the decision came down, the
wave of software and business method patent cases growing out of the dotcom bubble began reaching the district courts.171 The continued high
reversal rate172 in conjunction with the Federal Circuit’s unwillingness to
grant interlocutory review of claim construction rulings fueled criticism of
the patent litigation system.173 The National Academies of Science and the

166

Id. at 1455–56 (quoting Markman, 517 U.S. at 389). This explanation, however, overlooks a
critical passage in the Supreme Court’s Markman decision. See infra Part IV.A; Peter S. Menell,
Reconsidering Cybor: A Hybrid Standard of Appellate Review of Patent Claim Construction Rulings
10–13 (UC Berkeley Sch. of Law Research Paper July 5, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2289343 (reproducing Brief of Professor Peter S. Menell as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff–Appellee, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North
America Corp., 500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2013) (No. 2012-1014)).
167
See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1465–66 (Mayer, C.J., joined by Newman, J., concurring in the
judgment).
168
See id. at 1473–74 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV
of the en banc opinion).
169
See id. at 1475–76.
170
See, e.g., Dunner & Kwon, supra note 159, at 497 (arguing that the de novo standard “may
undermine the judicial role” in patent litigation and urging some deference to district courts).
171
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 28–32 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (noting that a surge in patenting led to a doubling
of “the number of patent lawsuits settled in or disposed by federal district courts” “between 1998 and
2001, from 1,200 to nearly 2,400”).
172
See Chu, supra note 7 (reporting a 44% reversal rate); Moore, supra note 7, at 239 (reporting a
37.5% reversal rate); Zidel, supra note 7, at 741–42 (reporting a 41.5% reversal rate).
173
See Mazumdar, supra note 8; O’Malley et al., supra note 8, at 681–82 (remarks of Judge Patti
Saris).
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Federal Trade Commission undertook comprehensive studies of the
problems plaguing the patent system.174
The Federal Circuit continued to tinker with presumptions and the
hierarchy of sources in an effort to make claim construction more
predictable. In Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,175 another
panel sought to further clarify the claim construction framework by
recognizing dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises as “particularly useful
resources to assist the court in determining the ordinary and customary
meanings of claim terms” due to their public availability and objectivity.176
The court noted that, unlike expert testimony, these reference sources are
not “colored by the motives of the parties” or “inspired by litigation.”177
“Indeed, these materials may be the most meaningful sources of
information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and
the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the
technology.”178
3.

Omnibus Reconsideration of Claim Construction: Phillips v.
AWH Corp.—The doctrinal adjustments following Cybor
produced greater confusion179 and higher reversal rates.180 In an effort to
address the inconsistency across its own decisions and quell the widespread
dissatisfaction among district judges and practitioners with its claim
construction jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review in
Phillips v. AWH Corp., a case appropriately struggling to interpret the term
“baffles.”181 The court issued an unusual order182 inviting briefs directed to

174

AND

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note

171.

175

308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), overruled by Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc).
176
See id. at 1202. The Texas Digital court drew in part on the statement in Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996), that “technical treatises and
dictionaries . . . are worthy of special note.” Id.
177
Id. at 1203.
178
Id.
179
See Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on
Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 181, 189–90 (2003)
(asserting that the use of dictionaries makes the claim interpretation process unpredictable); Jennifer R.
Johnson, Out of Context: Texas Digital, The Indefiniteness of Language, and the Search for Ordinary
Meaning, 44 IDEA 521, 540–41 (2004); see also O’Malley et al., supra note 8 (presenting a colloquy
among three leading district court jurists with extensive experience with patent cases); accord SciMed
Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Dyk, J.,
concurring) (“Until we provide better [claim construction] guidance, I fear that the lower courts and
litigants will remain confused.”).
180
See Moore, supra note 7 (reporting a 34.5% reversal rate); see also Schwartz, supra note 6, at
240 (finding a similar reversal rate).
181
415 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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seven detailed questions, ranging from the role of evidentiary sources
(dictionaries, specification, prosecution history, and expert testimony) to
the standard of appellate review.183
With input from over thirty amicus briefs as well as briefs from the
parties, the resulting decision affirmed the Federal Circuit’s Markman
framework whereby claims are to be given their ordinary and customary
meaning from the perspective of one skilled in the art.184 The majority
emphasized the role of intrinsic evidence and especially of the specification
in construing claims, observing that the specification is “[u]sually . . .
dispositive” and “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
term.”185
The majority authorized trial courts to consider extrinsic evidence, but
deemed it “less significant” and “less reliable” in determining the scope of
claim terms.186 It recognized that expert testimony can be useful “to provide
background on the technology at issue, to explain how an invention works,
to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the
patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish
that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning
in the pertinent field,” but that “conclusory, unsupported assertions by
experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.”187
While continuing to recognize the objectivity of dictionaries, the
majority nonetheless backed away from Texas Digital’s presumption that a
dictionary meaning would apply unless the term in question was explicitly
defined in the specification or where the intrinsic evidence disavowed or
disclaimed such meaning.188 Such a methodology, in the court’s view,
improperly “focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather
than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.”189
The court emphasized the specification as the primary source for
interpreting patent claims, but acknowledged that “there is no magic
formula or catechism” or “rigid algorithm” for conducting claim
182

See Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO.
L. REV. 733, 740–42, 747 (2011) (characterizing the en banc order in Phillips as unusual in the scope of
the questions posed and the process as akin to a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act).
183
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam); see
also id. at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring) (inviting comment on an additional set of questions); id. (Mayer,
C.J., dissenting) (calling for the court to reconsider its en banc holdings in Markman and Cybor that
claim construction is a pure question of law subject to de novo review).
184
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17.
185
Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
186
See id. at 1317–18.
187
See id. at 1318.
188
See id. at 1320–21.
189
See id. at 1321.
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construction.190 Trial judges may consider any particular source of evidence
in whatever sequence they deem appropriate so long as they do not
“contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic
evidence.”191
The majority declined to revisit the scope of appellate review of claim
construction rulings, noting that while it had considered the matter, it
“decided not to address [the] issue at this time,” leaving Cybor’s de novo
standard in place.192 Nonetheless, lingering division among the members of
the court remained. While adhering to the view that claim construction is a
question of law subject to de novo review, Judge Lourie, joined by Judge
Newman, wrote separately to urge his colleagues “to lean toward
affirmance of a claim construction in the absence of a strong conviction of
error.”193 In dissent, Judge Mayer, joined by Judge Newman, reiterated his
continued frustration with “the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court’s
persistence in adhering to the falsehood that claim construction is a matter
of law devoid of any factual component.”194
4. Continuing Division over the De Novo Standard.—The division
over the standard of appellate review has periodically resurfaced during the
past several years.195 In 2012, the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to
revisit the topic. In reviewing a petition for certiorari challenging the
Federal Circuit’s de novo standard, the Court requested the views of the
U.S. Solicitor General.196 The Solicitor General recognized that “[t]he
question whether deferential review is appropriate [when reviewing factual
determinations in claim construction] is of substantial and ongoing
importance in patent law.”197 However, the Solicitor General ultimately
urged the Court to decline the writ of certiorari because the district court
had not made “any factual findings or resolve[d] any evidentiary disputes
in interpreting the patent claims at issue here.”198 The Court denied
190

See id. at 1324.
See id.
192
See id. at 1328.
193
See id. at 1330 (Lourie, J., joined by Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194
See id. (Mayer, J., joined by Newman, J., dissenting).
195
See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Moore, J., joined by Rader, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
833 (2013) (mem.); Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
id. at 1363–64 (Clark, District Judge (E.D. Tex.), concurring); Medegen MMS, Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc.,
317 F. App’x 982, 988–91 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Walker, Chief District Judge (N.D. Cal.), dissenting)
(urging greater deference); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (Moore, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
196
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 133 S. Ct. 72 (2012) (mem.) (inviting the
Solicitor General to file a brief).
197
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Retractable Techs., 133 S. Ct. 833 (No. 111154), 2012 WL 5940288, at *7.
198
Id. at *8.
191
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certiorari in January 2013.199 Just a few months later, the Federal Circuit
granted en banc review of the standard of appellate review of claim
construction rulings in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics
North America Corp.200
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: THE IMPACT OF PHILLIPS V. AWH
In order to analyze the ongoing controversy over claim construction
review, we developed a comprehensive database of appellate claim
construction decisions from 2000 through 2011. This Part presents the
results of our empirical study. Section A provides a brief review of
previous empirical studies of patent claim construction. Then, section B
describes the design of our study. Section C presents our results, including
the overall trend in reversal rates, the evidentiary sources referenced in
Federal Circuit decisions, judge-specific voting patterns, technologyspecific patterns, the rate of summary affirmance, and the role of the skilled
artisan perspective. Finally, section C interprets our principal finding—that
claim construction reversal rates have dropped significantly since Phillips.
We find that the drop in reversal rates is principally attributable to the
emergence of informal deference to district court claim construction
decisions at the Federal Circuit.
A. Previous Empirical Studies
The vicissitudes of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction
jurisprudence have resulted in numerous empirical studies. Prior to
Phillips, the most comprehensive study of claim construction was
conducted by then-Professor Kimberly Moore.201 In two influential papers,
Moore studied all precedential, nonprecedential, and summary affirmance
claim construction decisions at the Federal Circuit from April 23, 1996 (the
date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman), through 2003.202 She
found that the Federal Circuit reversed claim construction decisions on
34.5% of appealed claim terms,203 a rate that resulted in 29.7% of all
appeals involving a question of claim construction being remanded or
reversed.204 Moore surmised that the high rate of reversal was due to the

199

See Retractable Techs., 133 S. Ct. 833, denying cert. to 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
201
Moore, supra note 7.
202
Moore, supra note 1, at 8–9; Moore, supra note 7, at 239.
203
Moore, supra note 7, at 239. Judge Moore calculated reversal rates in three manners, which we
discuss infra note 244. She found that 37.5% of cases involved the reversal of at least one term.
204
Id. A finding of a higher reversal rate by term than by case is explained by the fact that a claim
construction case contains at least one appealed claim term, but potentially more than one. Thus, a case
that has ten terms, nine of which are affirmed, one of which is reversed, would have a 10% reversal rate
by term, but count as one case reversed. If the case were remanded or reversed (as it likely would be
200
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Federal Circuit’s muddled claim construction jurisprudence.205 Several
follow-on studies substantiated Moore’s findings of high reversal rates prePhillips.206
Professors R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge’s empirical work
focused on the methodological split among Federal Circuit judges.207 Their
study grouped judges into three categories: (1) proceduralists, who give
primary weight to the claim language (and the ordinary meaning, often
derived from dictionaries); (2) holistics, who interpret patent claim terms
using an open-ended methodology drawing upon the full range of
interpretive tools—claim language, specification, prosecution history,
dictionaries, and expert testimony; or (3) “swing” judges, a middle group
that does not subscribe to either the procedural or holistic methodology.208
They found that claim construction appeal outcomes were highly dependent
on the composition of the appellate panel,209 which substantially explained
both pre- and post-Phillips appellate decisions.210 Wagner and Petherbridge
could not confirm that Phillips had a “significant impact on the stability
and predictability” of claim construction.211
Professor David Schwartz has examined whether district court judges
improve their performance of claim construction over time.212 He found no
evidence that district judge reversal rates dropped as judges gained
experience.213 Schwartz suggested three possible explanations for his
unless other issues such as infringement allow for affirmance), the case would be coded as one reversed
case.
205
Id. at 247.
206
See Bender, supra note 6, at 203, 207 (finding a 40% reversal rate from 1996 to 2000); Chu,
supra note 7, at 1092, 1104 (finding a 44% reversal rate from 1998 to 2000); Zidel, supra note 7, at
741–42 (finding a 41.5% reversal rate in 2001). Many of these studies found the reversal rate to be
much higher than that reported by Judge Moore. The higher rates in these later studies were due to the
omission in the follow-on studies of summary affirmance cases. See Moore, supra note 7, at 235–38 &
nn.15–17. A significant minority of claim construction appeals are decided through the Rule 36 process.
For example, Judge Moore’s study found 104 relevant Rule 36 cases over the time period analyzed.
Over that same span, there were 651 relevant opinion cases. Id. at 239 & n.31. Failing to include such
cases overestimates the reversal rate because all Rule 36 decisions are affirmances.
207
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1110–11.
208
Id. at 1111 & n.19, 1112.
209
Id. at 1112, 1158–59.
210
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11 (manuscript at 133–38).
211
Id. (manuscript at 142).
212
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 225. Schwartz’s study examined every case between April 24, 1996,
and June 30, 2007, in which a construed claim term was appealed. Id. at 238.
213
Id. at 267. Professor Schwartz’s study included all appellate claim construction decisions:
precedential, nonprecedential, and Rule 36. Id. at 238. His study’s reversal rate is similar to that of
Judge Moore’s study: 33.9% of terms were wrongly construed in Schwartz’s study compared to 34.5%
of terms in Judge Moore’s study. Id. at 240. Schwartz’s study includes nearly two years of cases
decided after Phillips whereas Moore’s study preceded Phillips. Schwartz does not indicate or suggest
that either the reversal rate or judges’ ability to “learn” how to construe claims has improved after
Phillips.
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findings: (1) inherent indeterminacy in claim construction, (2) failure of the
Federal Circuit to properly instruct district courts, or (3) failure of district
court judges to learn how to perform claim construction.214 Schwartz
concluded by calling for further study of the “cause” of the high claim
construction reversal rate.215 Schwartz has also found that the reversal rate
of claim construction cases in the pre-Markman era was much lower than
that of the post-Markman era.216
B. Our Study
1. Design and Methodology.—The database that we created for this
study contains every appellate claim construction decision issued between
January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2011. It includes all precedential,
nonprecedential, and summary affirmance (Rule 36) opinions.217 The
database covers 1930 individual claim terms from 1067 cases. Some cases
in the database involve a single disputed claim term, while some involve
multiple terms.218
In order to identify relevant cases, we performed an overinclusive
search on LexisNexis to capture all patent-related appeals in which the
Federal Circuit discussed the proper construction, definition, or
interpretation of claim language. The results of that search were then
examined by human coders to determine whether the cases were relevant to
our study. A case was deemed relevant if the Federal Circuit reviewed the
district court’s construction of a claim term.219
Rule 36 of the Federal Circuit’s Rules permits the court to enter a
judgment of affirmance without written opinion in certain cases.220 Because
summary affirmances lack a written opinion, we established a separate
protocol for determining relevancy of such cases. A LexisNexis search was
performed that returned all patent cases that resulted in a Rule 36
affirmance from 2000 to 2011. Human coders then examined the appellate
briefs of each case to determine relevancy. A Rule 36 case was deemed
relevant for the study if the briefs challenged the district court’s

214

Id. at 267.
Id. at 267 n.219.
216
David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1093 fig.A
(2010) (finding a 20.8% reversal rate pre-Markman).
217
For a critique of studies that fail to include Rule 36 cases, see Moore, supra note 7, at 234–35.
218
Each term occupies a separate entry in the database. On average, each case contains 1.8
appealed claim terms.
219
A few cases involved appeals of the district courts’ failure to construe a claim. In such cases, the
term was included in the database only if the Federal Circuit directly construed the claim. If the Federal
Circuit merely reviewed the decision not to construe, the term was not included in the database.
220
FED. CIR. R. 36.
215
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construction of a claim term. Further details on the specifics of relevancy
determinations can be found in Appendix A.221
Once we accumulated the relevant cases, we hand coded each case and
each claim term across three broad categories of information: case data,
claim term data, and construction evidence. The data are described more
fully in Appendix A. Of particular relevance for reversal rates, we coded
each claim term’s final disposition on appeal as either (1) affirmed,
(2) reversed, or (3) avoided.222 Similarly, each case was coded with a final
disposition. Rule 36 cases were automatically coded as “affirmed.”
The time period of our study (2000–2011) was selected for several
reasons. First, the period provides a balanced frame to evaluate the Federal
Circuit’s tendencies before and after its Phillips decision. Phillips was
decided around the midpoint of our study period (July 12, 2005), allowing
us to compare a large number of appealed claim terms from the five-andone-half-year period before Phillips and the six-and-one-half year period
following Phillips.223 Second, the twelve-year period provides a large
amount of data sufficient for an empirical assessment of Phillips’s impact.
Lastly, 2000–2011 represents a relatively stable era for the Federal Circuit.
Of the eleven judges in active status on January 1, 2000, all but one served
on the court through the entire period of our study.224 The sole exception,
Chief Judge Michel, served on active status until his retirement on May 31,
2010.225 During the time period of our study, six judges were added to the
Federal Circuit: Judges Dyk, Prost, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna, and
Wallach.226 The latter three judges have not heard a significant number of
claim construction cases over the time period of our study.227 The relative
stability of the court during this time period reduces the likelihood that any

221

David Schwartz has used a similar method to determine relevance to claim construction. See
Schwartz, supra note 6, at 239.
222
“Avoided” terms (eighty-five terms total) were not included in the results section of this Article
because they do not constitute either affirmances or reversals. See Appendix A.
223
The database includes 1010 claim terms from the period before Phillips and 885 claim terms
from the period after Phillips.
224
A number of judges took senior status during the period of our study: Judge Plager (2000),
Judge Clevenger (Feb. 1, 2006), Judge Schall (Oct. 5, 2009), Judge Mayer (June 30, 2010), and Judge
Gajarsa (July 31, 2011). See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d
1003, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). All five remained on the court during
the duration of the time period of our study.
225
Chief Judge Michel Will Retire on May 31, 2010, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/index.php?option=com_%20content&view=article&id=3:chiefjudge-michel-will-retire-on-may-31-2010 (last visited Jan. 13, 2014).
226
Judges, supra note 224.
227
Judge O’Malley heard ten of the cases that are included in our database; Judge Reyna heard
seven; Judge Wallach did not hear any.
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changes that we observe after Phillips were attributable to changes in
personnel.228
2. Limitations of the Database.—As with any empirical examination
of judicial behavior, there are a number of limitations that should be
acknowledged. First, our dataset is limited to appellate decisions. District
court judges construe an enormous number of claim terms that are never
appealed to the Federal Circuit. Our study is not designed to capture those
unappealed claim terms. It is possible that district courts are much more
accurate in construing claims than is generally acknowledged and that
claim construction reversal rates would be lower if every construed term
were appealed. Our study, however, is not designed to answer the question
of district court accuracy.229 Rather, it examines appellate behavior and the
impact of Phillips on that behavior.
The second potential drawback to our methodology is the selection
bias inherent in an examination of appellate decisions. Economic theory
suggests appellate cases represent those cases in which rational actors are
most likely to disagree on the correct outcome.230 While critics have pointed
out that actual affirmance rates at appellate courts do not support this
theory,231 it is undoubtedly true that appealed claim terms, on average,
represent those claim terms that are most difficult to construe. Again,
however, our study is not meant to determine the rate of correct claim
construction. We are concerned only with appellate practice, and thus,
restricting our study to appealed claim terms provides the best evidence
from which to make claims about appellate behavior. Furthermore, there
are good reasons to suspect that the Priest–Klein framework is less
applicable when examining a subset of appealed issues rather than all
appealed cases.232

228

An additional benefit of the time period of our study is that, with minor exceptions, all of the
briefs and opinions needed for our study were accessible through online databases. Only the briefs of
Rule 36 cases decided between January and May of 2000 were not accessible via LexisNexis or
Westlaw as of the time of this writing. To determine relevancy and to code these cases, we searched the
archives at the Federal Circuit library. Our thanks to the excellent librarians at the court.
229
For a discussion of the value of such district court accuracy, see Moore, supra note 1, at 28–29.
See also Schwartz, supra note 6, at 226 (noting that the high reversal rate of district court judges’ claim
construction leads to unpredictability and discourages settlement).
230
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4, 16–17 (1984).
231
See Jason Rantanen, Why Priest–Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in Patent Cases
(Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-15, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132810. But see Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining
Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for
Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 236–42 (1996) (determining that the Priest–Klein predicted win rate
of 50% is accurate when the underlying assumptions of their model hold true).
232
See Rantanen, supra note 231. For a more complete discussion of selection effects in claim
construction empirical research, see Schwartz, supra note 216, at 1101–07.
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That is not to say, of course, that our study is immune from concerns
about the data. If the distribution of appealed cases changed significantly
near the date of the Phillips decision, we would observe a change in
reversal rates (or other data) that is, in fact, unrelated to the Phillips
decision. Appellate courts are incredibly complex institutions; we cannot
hope to isolate all of the inputs that affect the outcome of any particular
appeal. We do not suggest that Phillips is the only factor in claim
construction appeals over the time period of our study. Countless other
economic, legal, political, and social factors have changed during the
course of our study.
Lastly, as with any hand-coded database, there are concerns about the
quality of the data. We have taken a number of steps to ensure that the
dataset is reliable. First, we only utilized coders with scientific
backgrounds. All of the coders participated in a one-semester course about
claim construction or equivalent training. A coding manual describing the
coding procedure was created in order to increase reliability. Additionally,
we double coded many cases in order to test inter-rater agreement. Cohen’s
Kappa was chosen as the test of inter-rater reliability.233 For the majority of
coding related in this article, Cohen’s Kappa ranged from 0.845 to 0.978.234
In general, we found the reliability of the coding system to be high.
We also compared portions of our dataset with Kimberly Moore’s
studies to gauge the accuracy of the cases chosen for our study. Moore’s
studies contain a time period that overlaps with our study (2001–2003).235
The results from the two studies are very similar: our database contains 603
terms over that time period, while Moore’s database included 604;236 our

233

Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF.
L. REV. 63, 113–14 (2008) (stating that it is crucial to use a measurement of intercoder reliability, such
as Cohen’s Kappa).
234
Cohen’s Kappa ranges from 0 to 1, with numbers near one indicating higher degrees of
reliability. Id. For claim term outcomes (agree/disagree) our database had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.940.
For case relevance, our database had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.890. For panel composition, our database
had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.978. For evidentiary sources, our database had a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.845.
235
Although Moore’s published studies give only cumulative results, by comparing the results
from her first study, Moore, supra note 1, at 4, 11–14 (covering 1996–2000), with that of her follow-up
piece, Moore, supra note 7, at 239–45 (covering 1996–2003), we were able to obtain results from 2001
to 2003. Her first publication reports a total of 496 terms, see Moore, supra note 1, at 23, while her
follow-up piece reports 1100 terms, see Moore, supra note 7, at 243–44; thus a total of 604 were
identified in the interim period of 2001 to 2003.
236
It should be noted that we did not include all of those 603 claim terms in the results of this
Article. We choose not to use appeals arising from claim construction decisions at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office because of the differing standards with which the Patent Office and
district courts construe claims. See Appendix A for a discussion of the cases we excluded from the final
results of this Article.
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data indicate a reversal rate of 39.4% over that period, while Moore finds
the rate to be 39.7%.237
C. Empirical Results: Has Claim Construction at the Federal Circuit
Changed Since Phillips?
1. Reversal Rates.—Prior to Phillips, the reversal rate of claim
construction appeals at the Federal Circuit was widely perceived as
unacceptably high.238 Critics argued that the high reversal rate demonstrated
that the Federal Circuit was failing to reduce the uncertainty surrounding
patent rights. Furthermore, the uncertainty involved in the claim
construction appeal process was frustrating to both district court judges and
judges on the Federal Circuit.239 Patent holders and technology companies
also complained about prolonged and increasingly expensive litigation. The
Phillips decision was in part designed to reduce the reversal rate of claim
construction appeals at the Federal Circuit.240
The perception of high reversal rates during the period before Phillips
is supported by the data. During the five-and-one-half years prior to
Phillips (January 1, 2000–July 12, 2005), the reversal rate was 37.2% for
appealed claim terms.241 Measured by cases with at least one erroneously
construed term, the pre-Phillips reversal rate was 40.6%.242 The result of the
frequent claim term reversals was that 30.2% of pre-Phillips cases were
reversed, vacated, or remanded due to an erroneous claim construction at
the district court level.243
237

We calculated Moore’s reversal rate for 2001 to 2003 as follows. First, we calculated the total
number of reversed terms from 1996 to 2003. We believe that number is 379 reversed terms (34.5%
reversal rate for 1100 total terms). See Moore, supra note 7, at 243–44. Second, we found the total
number of reversed terms from 1996 to 2001: 139 (28% reversal rate for 496 terms). See Moore, supra
note 1, at 23. Third, by subtracting the number of reversals from 1996 to 2001 from the number of
reversals from 1996 to 2003, we obtained 240 reversals from 2001 to 2003. Lastly, we divided the
number of reversals (240) from the total terms reviewed (604) for a 39.7% reversal rate.
238
See, e.g., Lefstin, supra note 7, at 1033 (“[I]f [claim] interpretation is at the core of patent law,
there are many who claim that core is now rotten.”); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt:
Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1026 n.2
(2007) (“Claim construction jurisprudence is in disarray. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reverses trial court claim construction decisions at a worryingly high rate. The
proportion of Federal Circuit claim construction opinions that include separate concurrences or dissents
continues to grow.” (quoting Miller, supra note 6, at 177)); Timothy J. Malloy & Patrick V. Bradley,
Claim Construction: A Plea for Deference, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 191, 191 (2006) (suggesting that claim
construction “remains as unpredictable as ever”).
239
Moore, supra note 1, at 29 (“Undoubtedly, with reversal rates so high, district court judges are
frustrated with the claim construction process.”).
240
See supra Part I.B.
241
N = 952 terms.
242
Two hundred fifteen appealed cases contained erroneous constructions. N = 530 cases.
243
For other studies calculating reversal rates, see Moore, supra note 7, at 239–45 (finding reversal
rates between April 1996 and December 2003 of 34.5% on a term-by-term basis, 37.5% on a case-by-
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Our data indicate that the reversal rate of claim construction appeals at
the Federal Circuit has dropped substantially since Phillips. The reversal
rate since July 2005 is 24.0% on a term-by-term basis. In that time the
court has reversed at least one term in 29.5% of appeals, resulting in a
remand, reversal, or vacation in 23.1% of cases. Table 2 summarizes the
key statistics, while Table 3 provides year-by-year reversal rates by term.244
TABLE 2: PRE- AND POST-PHILLIPS REVERSAL RATES (2000–2011)245
Pre-Phillips
37.2%

Post-Phillips
24.0%

Percentage of cases with at least one reversed
claim term

40.6%

29.5%

Percentage of cases resulting in remand,
reversal, or vacation due to claim construction
error

30.2%

23.1%

Percentage of terms reversed

TABLE 3: REVERSAL RATES BY YEAR
Year

Reversal Rate

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

24.6%
36.1%
40.7%
39.8%
44.2%
31.3%

case basis, and 29.7% on a by-case-impact basis), and Schwartz, supra note 6, at 240 (finding reversal
rates over the same time period of 33.9% on a term-by-term basis, 38.8% on a case-by-case basis, and
29.3% on a by-case-impact basis). The higher reversal rates in our study are likely due to the different
time periods studied. Neither Moore nor Schwartz included 2004 and the six months of 2005 in their
calculations, eighteen months that saw an unusually high reversal rate. Over 45% of cases during those
eighteen months involved at least one erroneous claim term (N = 137), and over 40% of terms reviewed
were reversed (N = 259). Furthermore, Moore and Schwartz have over three years of cases prior to 2000
that were not included in our database.
244
Three primary methods exist for calculating claim construction reversal rates: by individual
claim term (term-by-term); by cases with at least one reversed term (case-by-case); and by cases
reversed, vacated, and/or remanded due to erroneous constructions (by case impact). See Moore, supra
note 7, at 238. We report all three herein, but generally refer to term-by-term rates unless otherwise
indicated.
245
The relationship between pre- and post-Phillips cases and reversal rates was tested for an
association using logistic regression. The model included other explanatory variables, including field of
technology, district court, and Federal Circuit judges on the panel. From our logistic regression
analysis, we estimate the odds of affirmance are 75% higher (95% confidence interval: 38% to 122%
higher) in post-Phillips cases than in pre-Phillips cases. This estimate is statistically significant
(p < 0.001).
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2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

21.6%
24.8%
31.1%
16.5%
21.7%
20.4%

Figure 2 shows the term-by-term reversal rate as a rolling average over
100 terms.246
FIGURE 2: REVERSAL RATE—PER-CLAIM-TERM BASIS
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE)

246

The vertical reference line indicates the date of the Phillips decision. A similar demarcation line
appears throughout this Article.
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A similar pattern emerges for case-by-case reversals. Figure 3
illustrates the case-by-case reversal rate, which measures the rate at which
the Federal Circuit reversed at least one term in claim construction cases.
FIGURE 3: REVERSAL RATE—PER-CASE BASIS (AT LEAST ONE TERM)
(100 CASE ROLLING AVERAGE)

Prior to Phillips, reversal rates on claim construction were much higher
than reversal rates on other patent issues.247 Historically, the Federal Circuit
has reversed around 20% of appealed issues;248 however, the court was
reversing 37.2% of claim terms prior to Phillips. Now, the reversal rate for
claim construction appeals is much closer to that of other patent-related

247

See Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161,
1175 (2010) (footnote omitted) (finding that from 2000 to 2007, “the average reversal rate across all
issues other than claim construction [was] 18 percent, and 21 percent for all issues including claim
construction”); Paul M. Schoenhard, Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real Property Principles to
Guide Federal Circuit Patent Jurisprudence, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 299, 300
(2007) (“There is a pervasive perception that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reverses
district court rulings in patent cases at an inordinately high rate. . . . If one focuses, however, only on
the rate at which district court decisions involving claim construction are reversed on appeal, the figure
is higher than for patent cases generally.”).
248
See Moore, supra note 1, at 17 tbl.2 (examining every patent appeal from 1983 to 1999 and
finding a 22% reversal rate across all appealed issues).
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issues.249 Our data—showing a reversal rate of 24.0% since Phillips—
demonstrate that claim construction is no longer an extreme outlier at the
Federal Circuit.
2. Evidentiary Sources.250—There are two main types of evidence
courts can use when construing claims: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic
evidence consists of evidence from the patent document and file wrapper.
Within the patent document itself, courts can look to the claims and the
specification. Additionally, courts can examine the prosecution history of
the patent, the written record of the patent application, and correspondence
between the applicant and the Patent Office.251 District courts may also
consult a variety of extrinsic sources in construing claim terms, including
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises; expert testimony; inventor
testimony; and evidence of industry practice and norms.
Overall, the Federal Circuit’s use of evidentiary sources remains
largely unchanged since Phillips, with one significant but unsurprising
exception: the court has substantially decreased its reliance on dictionaries.
a. Intrinsic evidence.—Drawing on prior claim construction
jurisprudence, the Phillips opinion encouraged district courts to rely upon
intrinsic sources when performing claim construction.252 District judges
have largely followed Phillips’s encouragement. As reflected in Figure 4,
92.5% of terms in our database were construed using at least one form of
intrinsic evidence.253 Most cases relied on several. That rate has not
changed significantly since Phillips was decided.

249

Indeed, given the fact that claim construction decisions are afforded no deference, it is perhaps
surprising that reversal rates are now so low. Cf. Lefstin, supra note 7 (arguing that a reversal rate of
over 30% is consistent with reversal rates in other forms of complex litigation). Whereas many
appealed issues involve formal deference to the decision of the judge or jury below, only legal questions
are reviewed de novo. Questions of fact are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard. Even
questions of law, such as obviousness, that are decided by a jury are reviewed with a presumption
favoring the jury’s decision. Thus, only those issues of law that are decided by a judge (such as claim
construction) are truly considered anew at the Federal Circuit. We consider this issue more fully in
Part III infra.
250
Evidentiary statistics reported in this Article include only those cases that are precedential or
nonprecedential. Rule 36 summary affirmances are not included because no written opinion is issued in
those cases and therefore no analysis of evidentiary sources used by the Federal Circuit could be
performed.
251
One can analogize these three types to sources used in statutory construction, with the claims
representing the statutory language, the specification representing the explanatory notes and primary
legislative reports, and the prosecution history representing the legislative history.
252
See supra notes 184–91 and accompanying text.
253
That number has not changed much since Phillips: 93% before and 91.3% after.
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FIGURE 4: USAGE OF INTRINSIC EVIDENCE
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE)
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Not surprisingly, the most common source that the Federal Circuit
consults in determining claim meaning is the patent specification. The
specification describes the invention and teaches others how to practice the
invention.254 Because the specification is statutorily required to contain a
written description and an enabling disclosure of the invention,255 it has
long been a rich source of meaning for courts. From 2000 through 2011,
over 80% of appealed claim terms were analyzed in light of the
specification’s teaching. The court relied heavily on the specification to
determine claim meaning before (81.5% of terms) and after (80.2% of
terms) Phillips. The use of the specification to interpret claims at the
Federal Circuit has remained relatively consistent throughout the past
decade.
There has been a decrease in the use of prosecution history since
Phillips. Before Phillips, 46.9% of terms construed involved examination
of the prosecution history, while the Federal Circuit has examined the
prosecution history for only 37.1% of terms construed since that time.256
254

Technically, the claims form part of the specification. However, claims have become much
more important than the rest of the specification over the past century. Also, Phillips treats the claims as
separate from the specification for purposes of claim construction. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We follow that practice.
255
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
256
The drop in usage is statistically significant (p < 0.001).
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This drop in usage is likely tied to the differing views on claim construction
methodology that existed immediately prior to Phillips. The period
preceding Phillips exhibited a peak in the use of prosecution history as
construction evidence. Although Phillips confirmed that prosecution
history was part of the intrinsic record, the opinion emphasized the relative
importance of the specification and the claims as the most pertinent and
useful guides in ascertaining claim meaning.257 The use of prosecution
history to construe claims post-Phillips appears to have returned to the rate
observed in the early part of our study.
b. Extrinsic evidence.—The Federal Circuit has decreased its
reliance on extrinsic evidence since Phillips. Figure 5 illustrates that
leading up to the Phillips decision, the Federal Circuit was increasingly
reliant on some form of extrinsic evidence in claim construction
determinations.258 A decline in the use of extrinsic evidence followed the
decision. On average, before Phillips the Federal Circuit looked to extrinsic
evidence with 33.2% of terms. Since then, the court has examined extrinsic
evidence with only 26.3% of terms it has construed.259

257

See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (“Yet because the prosecution history represents an ongoing
negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often
lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.”).
258
Extrinsic Evidence codes: (1) Dictionary/Treatise, (2) Expert, (3) Other.
259
The drop in usage is statistically significant (p < 0.005).
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FIGURE 5: USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE)
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One type of extrinsic evidence—dictionaries—has become much less
common post-Phillips. As one would expect, the Federal Circuit’s use of
dictionaries in claim construction rose significantly after the Texas Digital
decision in 2002.260 After Phillips reversed that line of cases, the use of
dictionaries in construing claims declined precipitously, as reflected in
Figure 6. Since Phillips, the Federal Circuit is much less likely to refer to a
dictionary in construing a claim. Indeed in the last year of cases observed
in this study (2011), dictionaries were used to define only 9.7% of terms,
down from a high of 32.2% in the year before Phillips (2004).261

260

See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), overruled by
Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303.
261
The drop in usage is statistically significant (p < 0.001).
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FIGURE 6: USE OF DICTIONARIES
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE)
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In contrast to dictionary usage, the Federal Circuit’s use of expert
evidence has increased slightly since Phillips. Overall, the Federal Circuit
makes limited use of expert evidence in construing claims.262 The
consistently low use of expert evidence is unsurprising given the Federal
Circuit’s statement in Vitronics that expert evidence would “rarely, if ever”
be necessary to construe claims.263 Prior to Phillips, the court examined
expert evidence in 8.8% of appealed claim terms. It has done so in 12.1%
of terms since the decision.264

262

In coding for the use of expert evidence, we did not differentiate between instances in which the
Federal Circuit relied upon the evidence and when it rejected the use of such evidence. Thus, the
statistics reported herein describe the instances in which the Federal Circuit referenced such evidentiary
sources in its opinion.
263
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
264
The drop in usage is statistically significant (p < 0.05).
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FIGURE 7: USE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE)
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c. Summary of evidentiary sources.—The range of evidentiary
sources utilized in claim construction decisions has changed slightly since
Phillips: the court continues to rely heavily on the patent specification, is
slightly less likely to consult the prosecution history after Phillips, is
slightly more likely to consult expert opinion, and is much less likely to
consult dictionary definitions.
3. Judge-Specific Data.—Throughout the Federal Circuit’s history,
there has been a common perception that case outcomes are significantly
influenced by the outlook of the individual judges on one’s panel.265 We
assess this question by examining voting patterns by judge. A total of
sixteen judges adjudicated more than twenty-five appealed claim terms
during our study period. Several other judges heard a smaller number of
terms and are not included in the table below. Most of the judges who
heard fewer than ten terms were part of the Federal Circuit’s initiative to
invite federal judges from other courts (usually, but not always, district
265

See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 745 (2000) (discussing patent attorneys’ belief “that the
outcome of their case depends on the panel they draw”); see also Mary L. Jennings, Should Advocates
Be Informed of the Identities of Members of Judicial Panels Prior to Hearings?, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 41,
41–42 (1996) (noting Federal Circuit practice to inform parties of their panel composition on the day of
argument).
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court judges) to sit by designation. A smaller number of judges not
included in the table below were Federal Circuit judges who died shortly
after the initial period of our study or who joined the court near the end of
our study.266
Table 4 presents the voting behavior of judges both before and
after Phillips. The first and third columns indicate the percentage of terms
for which each judge voted to reverse before and after Phillips,
respectively. The second and fourth columns indicate the total claim terms
adjudicated by each judge during the pre- and post-Phillips time periods.
The final column indicates the change in rate of reversal votes since
Phillips.
TABLE 4: INDIVIDUAL VOTING BEHAVIOR

Judge
Archer
Bryson
Clevenger
Dyk
Friedman
Gajarsa
Linn
Lourie
Mayer
Michel
Moore
Newman
Plager
Prost
Rader
Schall

% Reverse
Votes:
Pre-Phillips

# of Terms:
PrePhillips

35.2%
41.5%
31.5%
49.1%
33.3%
30.2%
49.8%
34.8%
35.6%
34.9%
30.0%
30.8%
32.2%
38.5%
42.0%

54
236
235
171
63
235
227
233
188
261
237
91
143
257
205

% Reverse
Votes:
PostPhillips
20.0%
20.0%
26.9%
28.0%
27.1%
23.6%
28.7%
21.1%
19.0%
25.6%
24.6%
20.0%
29.2%
20.9%
28.4%
23.8%

# of Terms:
PostPhillips

Change,
Reverse
Vote Rate

35
235
93
214
48
237
261
232
195
142
171
225
48
234
261
185

-15.2%
-21.5%
-4.6%
-21.1%
-6.2%
-6.6%
-21.1%
-13.7%
-16.6%
-9.3 %
-10.0%
-1.6%
-11.3%
-10.1%
-18.2%

There is some variation among the frequency of individual reversal
votes.267 Prior to Phillips, the individual reversal-vote rate varied from
30.0% to 49.8%. This wide spread indicates that in the years prior to
266

Senior Judges Skelton and Smith died in 2004 and 2001, respectively. See Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/judges.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). Judge O’Malley was appointed in 2010; Judges Reyna and
Wallach were appointed in 2011. See Judges, supra note 224.
267
Judge Moore’s study also found some variation. See Moore, supra note 1, at 25–26 (finding,
pre-Phillips, that the affirmance-vote rate among judges with at least 100 terms construed to vary from
60% to 73%).
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Phillips, panel composition may have had a large impact on outcome.
Indeed, the spread is 1.5 times as large as the spread reported by Moore in
the years prior to our study (1996–2000).268 The large spread in our study
may indicate that the period 2000–2005 was particularly polarized.
Since Phillips, the divergence among judge reversal rates has
decreased. The range of individual reversal-vote rates since Phillips is
19.0%–29.2%. This narrower spread (around a mean of 24.0%) suggests
that while claim construction decisions may still be influenced by panel
composition,269 there is less variance than in the pre-Phillips era. Also
noteworthy is the way in which the voting patterns of certain judges have
changed dramatically since Phillips. Many judges on the court have
reduced their propensity to vote to reverse on claim construction by over
15%.
Chart 1 illustrates the change in reversal votes by judge. While judgespecific voting patterns are apparent (and likely inevitable for any difficult
legal issue), there is a surprising dearth of dissents in claim construction
cases. Over the twelve years we studied, there were 115 total dissents from
the majority’s claim construction—6.0% of all appealed terms.270 For a
legal issue that is commonly perceived to be fraught with ambiguity, the
relative unanimity of claim construction decisions at the Federal Circuit is
surprising. Interestingly, although claim construction dissents are relatively
rare, they are more frequent during the period immediately preceding
Phillips: eighteen of the dissents came in 2004, the year before Phillips,
with another fifteen occurring in 2005. If dissents are a bellwether of
change in claim construction jurisprudence, the nineteen dissents in 2010
suggest that the Federal Circuit is once again divided over claim
construction review.

268

Id.
Shawn P. Miller, Do “Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries Explain High Claim Construction
Reversal Rates? 22 (Aug. 30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (finding Judges Dyk, Linn, and Rader
“significantly more likely to find claim construction error”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139146.
270
Judge Moore’s pre-Phillips study found dissents from 3% of appealed terms. See Moore, supra
note 1, at 23.
269
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CHART 1: PERCENTAGE OF REVERSAL VOTES BY JUDGE

4. Technology Areas.—Previous commentators have suggested that
reversal rates may be tied to the increasing technological complexity of
patents.271 Our study revealed that high-tech fields do not dominate the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction docket: as Chart 2 demonstrates,
mechanical inventions constitute the largest portion of the court’s cases,
albeit a shrinking portion.272 Patents that are tied to the field of physics
(acoustics, optics, energy-related, and semiconductors) make up a relatively
small portion of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction docket.273 Patents
associated with chemicals and pharmaceuticals make up a more sizable
portion of the claim construction docket (12.5% and 6.2%, respectively),
271

For an argument that this might be the case, see Chu, supra note 7, at 1106. See also Moore,
supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that “the 33% error rate for claim construction creates doubt about the
abilities of district court judges to adjudicate complex technical patent cases”).
272
This observation corresponds with the percentage of all patents that are mechanical inventions.
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent
Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000) (finding that 32.9% of all issued patents were
mechanical inventions).
273
None of those categories take up more than 4.5% of the claim construction docket on appeal.
Energy-related and acoustic technologies comprise 2.4% and 2.2% of all patents, respectively, see id. at
2148 tbl.1, similar numbers to those patents’ appearance in claim construction appeals (1.7% and 0.5%,
respectively). Optics and semiconductor patents, on the other hand, do seem to be less frequently
involved in claim construction appeals than would be predicted in a random distribution. Those
technologies make up 12.8% and 9.3%, respectively, of all patents, see id., yet only appear in 2.3% and
4.4% of claim construction appeals, respectively.
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yet still a relatively small number of the overall terms in our database
(15.2% of unique terms construed).274 The ever-controversial category of
business method patents appear in less than 3.9% of cases, yet nearly half
of the appealed terms in that field are reversed.
One potential criticism of any time-sequence study of claim
construction is that patented technologies are constantly changing and one
era’s valuable technologies may be easier to construe than another era’s.
And it is certainly the case that the most valuable technologies during the
pre-Phillips period (2000–2005) differ from the valuable technologies of
the post-Phillips period (2005–2011). During the period from 2005 to
2011, high-tech electronic devices experienced tremendous growth.
Significant advances in communication technology—particularly wireless
communications—also occurred in this period. The changing technological
landscape is reflected in the increase that the court has seen in computerand communications-related patents post-Phillips as shown in Chart 2
below. It should be noted throughout this section that due to technological
overlap, we permitted multiple technological codings for the same patent.
Thus, the technological composition of the cases we studied will add up to
something more than 100%.
CHART 2: FREQUENCY OF APPEAL BY TECHNOLOGY
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Chemistry and pharmaceutical innovations constitute 28.5% of all patents issued. Id.
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Although mechanical patents are still the largest single category of
claim construction appeals, their frequency in appellate claim construction
decisions has diminished significantly in the years following Phillips.
Similarly, chemical patents make up a smaller portion of the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction cases in the six years following Phillips.
Computer-related and communications technologies experienced the
largest increase in frequency since Phillips. Claim construction appeals
from pharmaceutical patent cases—one of the most frequently affirmed
technology areas—are also more frequent since Phillips.
We cannot empirically rule out the possibility that the drop in reversal
rate since Phillips is tied to the change in technological makeup. It does
seem unlikely, however, that an increase in computer-related and
communications technologies would decrease the Federal Circuit’s
likelihood of reversal. Many computer-related and communications patents
are among the most complex and difficult-to-construe technologies.
Furthermore, one might suspect that a drop in the percentage of mechanical
inventions reviewed by the court would lead to an increase in the court’s
reversal rate because those patents are usually thought to be among the
simplest. As demonstrated above, however, the data indicate precisely the
opposite: in an era of increasing complexity, the Federal Circuit has
significantly reduced its propensity to reverse on claim construction.
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Chart 3 below provides more granulated data on technology reversal
rates.
CHART 3: REVERSAL RATES BY TECHNOLOGY FIELD

Intriguingly, the only technology category that exhibits an increased
reversal rate after Phillips is business methods. It is unclear why business
method patents alone would exhibit an increase in reversal rate postPhillips. The increase may be due to a growing suspicion of business
method patents from either the Federal Circuit or the district courts.
Alternatively, it may simply be the result of the relatively small number of
business method patents in our database. All other fields experienced a
reduction in reversal rates following Phillips. Appeals of pharmaceutical
claim construction are less frequent275 and have one of the highest
affirmance rates of all technologies (80%). This comports with what many
have suspected regarding the relative ease of accurately describing
inventive single-molecule drugs.276
5. Procedural Aspects of Claim Construction Appeals.—The Federal
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence has begun to change
procedurally as well as doctrinally. As reflected in Figure 8, the Federal
275

Only 6.6% of claim construction appeals are pharmaceutical patents.
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 106–07 (2008) (observing that
researchers have noted that chemical and pharmaceutical patents have more clearly defined boundaries
than other types of patents).
276
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Circuit has increasingly relied upon summary affirmances to dispose of
claim construction appeals.277 Whereas the court issued 18.7% of claim
construction cases before Phillips under Rule 36—the rule that permits
affirmance without opinion—it has done so in 30.2% of cases since that
time.
FIGURE 8: SUMMARY AFFIRMANCES
(50 CASE ROLLING AVERAGE)
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6. PHOSITA?—One of the most surprising results we found after
examining over a decade of Federal Circuit claim construction decisions is
the paucity of opinions that address the characteristics and views of the
PHOSITA. Black-letter claim construction jurisprudence reaffirmed in the
Phillips decision holds that courts must interpret claims from the standpoint
of the person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA).278 One would
expect, therefore, that many of the cases would identify the relevant
PHOSITA for the particular technology at issue, either as to educational or
technical background, experience, knowledge of the field, or other relevant
determinants of “skill.”
But the data, both pre- and post-Phillips, show very little
discussion of the PHOSITA. In only 12 of the 787 (1.5%) written claim
construction opinions issued from 2000 through 2011 does the Federal
Circuit even identify the PHOSITA. This result is stunning when one
277
278

FED. CIR. R. 36.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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considers the central role that the PHOSITA occupies in claim
construction. In spite of the PHOSITA’s importance, the Federal Circuit
rarely fleshes out what attributes the PHOSITA possesses. This may well
be the result of the Federal Circuit’s view of the diminishing importance of
factual aspects of claim construction.
III. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
Our most salient finding is the significant drop in claim construction
reversals since the Phillips decision. That alone will be welcome news for
many observers of the patent system. Increased certainty is beneficial for
any property rights system. Lower reversal rates foster efficient bargaining
between patent holders and those interested in making, using, and selling
inventions. District judges can celebrate the greater deference accorded
their decisions. And litigants will perhaps be better able to settle cases after
a claim construction ruling or before appeal, thereby reducing their
litigation costs and the disruption of their business.
Yet it is not clear why the reversal rate has fallen by approximately
one-third following a decision that largely reaffirmed prior holdings and
did not change the standard of review. As explained herein, we think the
answer lies with the Federal Circuit itself. Although Phillips did not
radically alter the law of claim construction, the data indicate that the case
represented a triumph for legal realism at the court: faced with
embarrassingly high reversal rates, the court entered an era of informal
deference to district court decisions. Before setting forth our theory of
informal deference, this Part will discuss other potential theories for the
reduction in the reversal rate.
A. External Impact of Phillips
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the reduction in claim
construction reversals following the Phillips decision is that the decision
reduced the frequency of legal errors by district courts. Because claim
construction is an issue reserved for judges,279 one possible explanation for
our findings is that Phillips provided judges with an evidentiary hierarchy
for performing claim construction which, if followed correctly, would
better withstand appellate scrutiny. Essentially, the argument goes, district
court judges now have a roadmap for crafting claim construction decisions
that are more likely to withstand appellate review.
We think that there is some merit to this theory. Although the Phillips
decision was a disappointment to many legal academics and practitioners—
many of whom had hoped for a more rigorous standard for interpreting
279

While some district courts rely heavily on magistrates or special masters to assist in claim
construction, the ultimate arbiter of claim language is the district court judge. See generally Ronald B.
Coolley, Magistrates and Masters in Patent Cases, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 374 (1984).
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claim language—the decision undoubtedly altered the manner in which
claim construction is handled at the district court level. Prior to Phillips,
many district courts followed the Federal Circuit’s Texas Digital standard.
Texas Digital emphasized the importance of dictionaries in interpreting
claims and led to litigation battles over which dictionary definition was the
most appropriate in a given case. Such “battles of the dictionaries” were
costly and unpredictable.280 Indeed, our data indicate that the high-water
mark for reversals occurred during the Texas Digital era.
But while this theory of improved guidance has some common-sense
appeal, our data suggest that something more is driving the decline in
reversal rates. First, if Phillips had reduced reversal rates simply by
teaching district court judges the proper method of claim construction, we
would expect to see reversal rates gradually drop over time. It should have
taken several years for claim construction decisions by district court judges
applying the Phillips framework to reach the Federal Circuit because claim
construction rulings are appealable only upon a final decision (after grant
of summary judgment or trial) and approximately a year in the appellate
process.281 Thus, if this first theory were operating, there should be a twoto-three-year lag in changes in reversal rates.
Instead of seeing a gradual reduction in claim construction reversals
after a lag, we find a large and immediate decline in the reversal rate.
Within one year of the Phillips decision, average reversal rates of the
previous 100 terms had dropped from 45% to around 25%.282 This indicates
that the change that has occurred since Phillips is, at least in part, due to a
change in the Federal Circuit’s review. Indeed, it is difficult to see what
change Phillips could have had on district court judges. The primary
contribution of Phillips to claim construction jurisprudence was in firmly
establishing the hierarchy between intrinsic and extrinsic construction
evidence. However, the court has always relied heavily on intrinsic sources.
As demonstrated in Part II.C.2, the use of intrinsic and extrinsic sources has
not been radically altered since Phillips. Instead, we see a mild increase in
the use of experts, a mild decrease in the use of prosecution history, and a
dramatic decrease in the use of dictionaries. We doubt that the decreased
reliance on dictionaries can, by itself, explain the dramatic reduction in
reversal rates.
One could also speculate that Phillips may have instructed litigants in
the types of claims that would be more likely to be reversed on appeal, thus
altering the types of claims that were selected for appeal. We believe,
however, that selection effects cannot fully explain the reduced reversal
280

During the Texas Digital era, some law firms invested in acquiring hundreds of scientific
dictionaries from different time periods.
281
Judge Alan D. Lourie, A View from the Court (Sept. 27, 2008), available at http://www.cafc.
uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2008/AL_Williamsburg_Speech.pdf.
282
See infra Figure 10.
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rates at the Federal Circuit. Rational litigants reacting to a significant drop
in reversal rates would appeal fewer overall terms, yet succeed more often
in those appeals because they are only appealing the most meritorious
claims. This reaction would lead to an increase in reversal rates as only the
most egregious cases would be appealed. Instead, the reversal rate has
decreased. As time has passed and litigants have had time to assess the
impact of Phillips, the reversal rate has not returned to pre-Phillips
levels.283 In fact, the rate of reversal has continued to drop. The continued
drop of reversal rates suggests that Phillips’s impact extends beyond
instructing litigants as to the merits of their cases. Ultimately, we believe
that the reduced claim construction reversal rates following Phillips are the
result of something beyond merely better instructions for district judges
and litigants.
B. Internal Impact of Phillips
1. Methodology.—Academics (and some Federal Circuit judges)
have long suggested that claim construction at the Federal Circuit is
plagued by panel effects. For example, Professors Wagner and
Petherbridge have argued that the methodology employed by individual
Federal Circuit judges is outcome determinative. Specifically, they found
that characterization of a judge’s methodology as either “proceduralist” or
“holistic” had a statistically significant impact on claim construction
outcomes.284 Thus, one might argue that Phillips’s impact can be traced to
the resolution of this interpretive debate identified by Wagner and
Petherbridge.285 According to that line of thinking, Phillips resolved an
internal dispute among the judges with one camp’s methodology prevailing
over the other camp’s.
We did not code for Wagner and Petherbridge’s methodological
distinctions, so we cannot comment on the continuing validity of their
findings. However, looking at individual judges’ voting patterns following
Phillips reveals that whatever changes occurred following Phillips occurred
across the entire court and not to a specific group of judges. The impact of
Phillips appears much deeper than the resolution of a methodological
divide.
Wagner and Petherbridge identify two types of decisionmakers:
holistic and proceduralist. The “holistic” approach to claim construction is
a “less structured analysis, utilizing the array of possible interpretive
283

The most recent year studied, 2011, saw a reversal rate of barely over 20%, less than half the
pre-Phillips level.
284
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1133–34 (defining what is meant by “procedural” and
“holistic” methodologies).
285
Note that Wagner and Petherbridge do not make this argument. In fact, they argue that Phillips
did not change the methodological split on claim construction. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note
11 (manuscript at 133–38).
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information in a flexible, case-specific fashion.”286 Proceduralists prefer to
focus on the claim language and to search for the generally understood
meaning of that language.287 Phillips was largely a holistic victory: it
emphasized a hierarchy of sources and encouraged judges to look to the
patent document (particularly the claims and the specification) for
meaning.288 Thus, after Phillips, proceduralist judges may have felt that
their method had been rejected and altered their voting patterns
accordingly, while holistic judges, feeling vindicated, could have continued
to vote as they always had.
Instead, we observe something different: both groups—holistics and
proceduralists—changed their voting patterns in similar ways following
Phillips. For example, as reflected in Figure 9, Judge Bryson (characterized
as a holistic) dramatically reduces his rate of voting for reversals in claim
construction cases following Phillips. Indeed, Judge Bryson appears to be
the judge whose voting pattern is most affected by Phillips, as his tendency
to vote to reverse drops by 21.5% following the decision. If the “Phillips
effect” were solely the result of settling a methodological question amongst
the judges, we would expect to see the “holistics”—those judges who were
using Phillips’s methodology before the decision—to have relatively stable
reversal votes before and after the decision. However, this is not the case.
The judges identified as holistics significantly altered their voting
behavior.289
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See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1111 n.19.
Wagner and Petherbridge identify Judges Clevenger, Dyk, and Linn as “proceduralist” judges.
Id. at 1153 n.161.
288
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 11 (manuscript at 129) (“[T]he en banc Phillips opinion
clearly suggests that the holistic approach is likely to be the better one . . . .”).
289
All of the holistic judges altered their reversal voting patterns significantly: Judge Bryson
(-21.5%), Judge Lourie (-13.7%), and Judge Newman (-10.0%). See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra
note 1, at 1153 n.161 (identifying Judges Bryson, Lourie, and Newman as “holistic” judges). Appendix
B more fully depicts the changes in these judges’ voting after Phillips.
287
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FIGURE 9: JUDGE BRYSON’S REVERSAL PATTERN
(50 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE)
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The proceduralist judges—Judges Dyk, Clevenger, and Linn—also
exhibit a change in voting patterns after Phillips: Judges Dyk and Linn are
two of the judges whose reversal rates changed most dramatically
following Phillips, both falling by 21.1%.290 Thus, Phillips affected both
camps in a similar manner. Whatever doctrinal divides existed before
Phillips likely continue to exist to this day. Phillips had a broad impact on
the voting behavior of the court. We think that this impact is best explained
through the emergence of a new, informal deference to district court
decisions.
2. Deference.—We think the most likely explanation for the reduced
reversal rate can be traced not to the majority opinion in Phillips, but rather
to the dissent. Judge Mayer (joined by Judge Newman) did not take issue
with the majority’s decision in Phillips. Rather, he took issue with the
court’s de novo standard of review of claim construction. Judge Mayer
contended that claim construction’s status as an issue of law was to blame
for the high reversal rate and that greater deference to district courts was
appropriate.

290

Judge Clevenger had a more modest reduction in his reversal rate (4.6%). It should be noted that
Judge Clevenger took senior status shortly after Phillips and therefore ruled on significantly fewer
terms in the post-Phillips period. See Appendix B.
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Following Phillips, it appears that the judges on the Federal Circuit
began to question the de novo standard. Indeed, we think that Phillips is
best understood as the beginning of the era of “informal deference” for
claim construction at the Federal Circuit. By informal deference, we mean
some standard that is less rigorous than de novo review and which defers,
on the margins, to district court determinations. By deferring to the
decisions of district courts, the Federal Circuit has decreased its reversal
rate of claim construction from a pre-Phillips high of 44% in 2004 to less
than 20% in 2009.
The immediate drop in reversal rates following Phillips demonstrates a
court that recognized the necessity of increased deference. As reflected in
Figure 10, the reversal rate ticked up following grant of en banc review
(dotted line), dropped significantly immediately following the oral
argument in Phillips (dashed line), and after an increase following the
issued opinion (solid line), the rate continued to drop. The court seems to
have collectively recognized that the decision to review every opinion de
novo had led to confusion and discontent.
FIGURE 10: REVERSAL RATE SHOWING CRITICAL DATES
(100 TERM ROLLING AVERAGE)

The increased use of the summary affirmance procedure also supports
a shift toward informal deference. Employing Rule 36 allows the Federal
Circuit to affirm the district court without having to provide its own
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reasoning for the construction.291 The rule may also provide cover for the
appellate court to affirm close decisions, even if the court might have come
out differently reviewing the law on its own.
Observation of the court reinforces our theory. Cybor’s de novo
standard of review has long been controversial, even among Federal Circuit
judges. A little over a year after the Phillips decision, a majority of the
court expressed a desire to revisit Cybor.292 Additionally, formal
recognition of some sort of deferential review has begun to creep into the
decisions of the court. Before retiring from the court, Chief Judge Michel’s
opinions began to frame the claim construction review process as
something less than true de novo review. For example, in Randall May
International, Inc. v. DEG Music Products, Inc., after reciting the standard
boilerplate language of standard of review,293 Chief Judge Michel explained
that “in reviewing a district court’s claim construction, this court takes into
account the views of the trial judge. Though we review those views and the
record de novo, ‘common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will
carry weight.’”294 This standard for review is explicitly deferential and thus
something less than de novo.295 Other judges have begun to frame the claim
construction inquiry in this rather paradoxical fashion as well.296 Several
members of the Federal Circuit believe that the time is ripe to recognize the
factual, evidentiary nature of the claim construction process. On several
occasions, multiple members of the Federal Circuit have indicated their
willingness to overrule Cybor in view of the factual nature of claim
construction.297 The grant of en banc review in Lighting Ballast Control
291

See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel,
C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1042 (Newman, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1044 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc); id. at 1045 (Gajarsa, Linn & Dyk, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (concurring
but stating willingness to consider the issue in a more appropriate case).
293
378 F. App’x 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
294
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
295
Chief Judge Michel used nearly identical language in Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606
F.3d 1338, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
296
Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 502 F. App’x 945, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J.)
(“We address claim construction as a matter of law, which we review without formal deference on
appeal, although we give respect to the conclusions and reasoning of the district court.”).
297
See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370–73 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Moore, J., joined by Rader, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that
“[c]laim construction is the single most important event in the course of a patent litigation”; the concern
expressed by commentators that claim construction appeals are “‘panel dependent’ which leads to
frustrating and unpredictable results for both the litigants and the trial court”; and the Supreme Court’s
observation in Markman that claim construction is a “mongrel practice” and hence “is clearly a mixed
question of law and fact and deference should be given to the factual parts”); id. at 1373 (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (expressing a desire to overturn Cybor); Trading Techs.
Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting with irony in view of the factual
292
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LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.298 indicates that the
appellate standard pendulum is gaining momentum.
IV. TOWARD A COHERENT STANDARD OF APPELLATE CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION REVIEW
By emphasizing the importance of claim construction and taking claim
construction out of the jury’s hands, the Markman case commenced a new
era in patent litigation. The Supreme Court sought to leverage trial judges’
comparative advantages in the “mongrel” practice of construing
documentary evidence from the standpoint of skilled artisans. The Court
also sought to illuminate the process of construing patent claims by taking
this task out of the black box of jury deliberations. Unfortunately, the
Federal Circuit’s adherence to the view that claim construction is a pure
question of law to which district courts’ judgments are owed no deference
has undercut trial judges’ fact-finding role and the transparency of the
claim construction process.
Our empirical analysis reveals that the Federal Circuit’s en banc
review of claim construction standards and procedures in the Phillips case
was a turning point in the evolution of judicial review of claim construction
decisions. The reversal rate dropped significantly shortly after the oral
argument and has consistently remained well below pre-Phillips levels. The
claim construction reversal rate of every member of the Federal Circuit has
fallen since that time. However, there remains substantial variation among
Federal Circuit judges in the degree of “deference” accorded lower court
claim constructions. More recent cases, as illustrated by the dissents from
rehearing the Retractable Technologies case en banc, confirm that the
Federal Circuit remains divided over the appellate review standard for
claim construction.
The drop in reversal rates since Phillips suggests that the Federal
Circuit is currently more deferential to district court claim construction
decisions than previously thought. The standards set forth in Phillips,
however, do not provide a doctrinal basis for increased deference.
nature of claim construction that “[t]his court’s prior en banc decision requires a review of the district
court’s claim construction without the slightest iota of deference”); Amgen, 469 F.3d at 1041 (Michel,
C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Lourie, J., joined by Newman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (proposing that the Federal Circuit “ought to lean toward affirmance of a claim
construction in the absence of a strong conviction of error”); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
138 F.3d 1448, 1480–91 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Newman, J., joined by Mayer, C.J., additional
views) (observing that “[t]he value of extrinsic evidence in claim interpretation is not surprising,
because patent documents are written by and for persons in the field of the invention, not for judges”;
although the patent and file history are the primary source of information concerning patent scope,
“such documents are directed to persons knowledgeable in the field; additional evidence and expert
testimony as to their meaning should be the rule, not the exception”).
298
500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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Although cutting back on the special role for dictionaries approved in the
Federal Circuit’s Texas Digital decision and affording district courts
somewhat greater leeway to consider extrinsic evidence, Phillips retained
the Cybor de novo review standard. If anything, the Phillips decision
enhanced the Federal Circuit’s scope of review by emphasizing the role of
the specification in patent claim construction. Yet the claim construction
reversal rate has unmistakably dropped. Thus, even though dozens of cases
and academic articles have examined the proper deference standard, the
proper standard remains elusive, even to members of the Federal Circuit.
Drawing upon jurisprudential foundations and functional criteria, we
offer a coherent resolution to this puzzle. The problem derives from the
ambiguity of “deference” as applied to the “mongrel” nature of claim
construction. The jurisprudential basis for “deferring” to lower court claim
constructions is not trial judges’ policy expertise or experience vis-à-vis the
Federal Circuit, but rather the inherently factual aspects of patent claim
construction. The functional basis derives from adjudication-specific and
systemic effects of different levels of deference to trial court claim
construction determinations.
This Part begins by clarifying the jurisprudential basis of claim
construction. It then examines the functional underpinnings of the standard
of review for patent claim construction determinations. These sections
provide the foundation for explicating the proper appellate review standard.
A. The Nature of Claim Construction
The starting point for assessing the proper standard for appellate
review of patent claim construction rulings is examination of the nature of
the inquiry. As the Supreme Court recognized in Markman, claim
construction has long been a “mongrel practice.”299 The trial court must
interpret claim terms from the standpoint of the skilled artisan within the
context of the intrinsic record. Trial judges gain this perspective through
extrinsic evidence which, when contested, requires subsidiary factual
assessments such as the credibility of expert witnesses. Even though
intrinsic evidence trumps contrary expert testimony, the interpretation of
the intrinsic evidence itself must be conducted from the standpoint of the
skilled artisan. While the Supreme Court established that the ultimate
interpretation of a patent claim term is for the trial judge to render, the
nature of the inquiry inherently involves factual determinations—how else
can lay judges300 stand in the shoes of skilled artisans?
At least since Markman, there has been a clear divide between district
judges and a majority of the Federal Circuit over whether claim
299

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).
See Plager, supra note 5 (observing that “[m]ost district court judges do not have scientific
training, and most have not chosen law clerks with technical or patent backgrounds”).
300
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construction entails fact-finding. All district court judges who have spoken
to the issue see a significant role for fact-finding in deciphering the
meaning of disputed patent claim terms from the standpoint of skilled
artisans.301 Federal Circuit Chief Judge Rader as well as Judges Newman,
Moore, and O’Malley share the view that the Federal Circuit should apply a
deferential standard of review, as did Chief Judges Mayer and Michel prior
to their retirements from the court.302 Furthermore, Judges Dyk, Gajarsa,
and Linn have acknowledged that the Federal Circuit should defer to the
district court on claim construction in at least those “atypical case[s] in
which the language of the claims, the written description, and the
prosecution history on their face did not resolve the question of claim
interpretation, and the district court found it necessary to resolve
conflicting expert evidence to interpret particular claim terms in the field of
the art.”303
Our empirical analysis indicates that a statistically significant de facto
shift in the appellate standard has already occurred. This suggests that the
disagreement over the standard of appellate review of claim construction
rulings has evolved from a difference in kind (whether claim construction
is a question of law or a mixed question) to a difference in degree (the
extent to which fact-finding enters into claim construction determinations).
The Federal Circuit justifies de novo review, in part, on a passage
taken out of context from the Supreme Court’s Markman ruling. In
Markman, the Supreme Court noted that its own “experience with
document construction” left it “doubtful” that there would be many cases
“in which a simple credibility judgment would suffice to choose between
experts whose testimony was equally consistent with a patent’s internal
logic.”304 It then observed that “[i]n the main, we expect, any credibility
determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated
analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule
that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument
as a whole.”305 From this inference, the Court reasoned that the trial
judge—possessing the “trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation
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See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, 595 F.3d at 1363–64 (Clark, District Judge (E.D. Tex.),
concurring); Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333–34 n.7 (D. Del. 1995)
(Schwartz, J.); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp. 844, 857 (D. Del.
1995) (McKelvie, J.); In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp.
1354, 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, Circuit Judge (7th Cir.), sitting by designation), aff’d, 71 F.3d
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Holderman, supra note 5, at 7, 14; O’Malley et al., supra note 8, at 680 (remarks
of Judge O’Malley).
302
See supra note 297.
303
See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc, 469 F.3d 1039, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Gajarsa, Linn & Dyk, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
304
Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
305
Id.
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to the overall structure of the patent”306—“is in the better position to
ascertain whether an expert’s proposed definition fully comports with the
specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal
coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat
construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to
a judge in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary
underpinnings.”307
In Cybor, the Federal Circuit read this passage to support its
conclusion that claim construction is a question of law and hence subject to
de novo review.308 That interpretive leap, however, misapprehends the
Supreme Court’s evident intention when the full paragraph is considered.
While the sentence noting that “any credibility determinations will be
subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole
document” might be read in isolation to downplay the factual
underpinnings of claim construction, the final sentence in the paragraph
makes clear that the Supreme Court intended the opposite in analogizing to
rulings that a trial judge routinely resolves during the course of trial, which
are not subject to de novo review.309 Thus, the more plausible interpretation
of the full passage is that the Supreme Court is inclined toward a
deferential standard of review of claim construction determinations
reflecting the inherently “mongrel”—mixed fact and law—character of
claim construction.
That the Cybor majority missed this subtlety is apparent in its
suggestion that “[n]othing in the Supreme Court’s opinion supports the
view that the Court endorsed a silent, third option—that claim construction
may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact.”310 In the
accompanying footnote to this sentence, the Cybor majority reasons that
“[i]f this were so, surely the Supreme Court would have discussed whether
subsidiary or underlying fact questions should be decided by the judge or
the jury.”311 Yet the Supreme Court’s passage answers this suggestion. It
analogizes the trial judge’s “trained ability to evaluate the testimony in
relation to the overall structure of the patent”312 to the “many other
responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial.”313 In
so stating, the Supreme Court justifies leaving the entire claim construction
306

Id. at 390.
Id.
308
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
309
See Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D.
267, 289–91 (2005) (observing that “[c]ourts commonly recite the deferential ‘abuse of discretion’ test
as broadly and generally appropriate on review of evidence calls”).
310
Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455.
311
Id. at 1455 n.4.
312
Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
313
Id.
307
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exercise in the trial judge’s hands “notwithstanding its evidentiary
underpinnings,”314 i.e., its factual character. Following this logic, subsidiary
factual issues in claim construction rulings, “like [the] many other
responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of a trial,”315
would be subject to a more deferential standard of review. In this way, the
Cybor majority overlooked the potential for subsidiary factual questions—
such as whether a patent claim term has special meaning to a skilled
artisan.
The next section evaluates the standard of appellate review based on
functional considerations—the type of inquiry that the Supreme Court
applied in determining that claim construction is a matter for the court and
not for the jury.
B. Functional Analysis of Appellate Review of Claim Construction
The standard of appellate review for claim construction determinations
potentially affects several key aspects of the patent system. It is useful to
distinguish between two levels of effects: (1) adjudication-specific
effects—the quality, timing, and costs of patent litigation; and (2) larger
systemic effects—predictability and consistency of patent boundaries.
1. Adjudication-Specific Effects.—At the adjudication-specific level,
the standard of appellate review influences the incentives and choices of
jurists and parties in patent litigation. The Federal Circuit’s de novo review
standard has had several deleterious effects on the quality, timing, and costs
of patent litigation. By downplaying the factual nature of claim
construction, the Vitronics and Cybor decisions discouraged district judges
from considering expert witnesses in the manner that would be most
productive.316 Even though technical experts may lack the training and
experience in interpreting documents, their perceptions about how to read a
claim term in the context of the intrinsic evidence could shed valuable light
on the ultimate interpretive question.317 A court might also benefit from
asking experienced patent drafters whether particular terms have accepted
meaning within the claim drafting art or how the prosecution history
314

Id.
Id.
316
See supra notes 150–52, 160–65 and accompanying text.
317
Cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader,
C.J.) (noting that the Supreme Court observed in Markman that the “trial court occupies the best
vantage point and possesses the best tools to resolve those evidentiary questions”); Amgen Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040–41 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[C]laim construction question[s] often cannot be
answered without assessing, at least implicitly, what the average artisan knew and how she thought
about the particular technology when the patent claims were written. To make such determinations, the
trial judge necessarily relies upon prior art documents and other evidence concerning the skill of the
ordinary artisan at the relevant time. Indeed, trial judges are arguably better equipped than appellate
judges to make these factual determinations, especially in close cases.”).
315
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illuminates claim meaning.318 As Professor Golden has argued, there is
good reason to view at least some claim terms from the patent attorneyplus-artisan standpoint.319 Our claim construction database reveals that
many, if not most, of the disputed appealed terms are not purely technical
terms but rather terms that are better understood from the standpoint of the
skilled claim drafter. It is rare for courts to admit into evidence claim
drafting custom and practice, yet that may well be the best source for
construing some and possibly many patent claim terms.
Thus, the Vitronics–Cybor framework for claim construction has
deprived the district court of critical evidence bearing on claim meaning.
Furthermore, the emphasis on intrinsic evidence and the erroneous view
that claim construction is a pure question of law has forced judges to spend
countless hours reading and rereading the patent specification without the
opportunity to fully and directly engage with those most familiar and
conversant with the patent claim language in its technological, industrial,
and claim drafting context. The de novo standard discourages trial judges
from hearing experts debate a claim term’s meaning and then using their
experience to make credibility determinations to resolve the dispute.
The limited record from Markman proceedings in conjunction with the
concern that touting extrinsic evidence is more likely to lead to reversible
error distorts the trial courts’ analysis and explication of their reasoning in
reaching a particular claim construction. Some district judges have decided
that it is better to provide little or no reasoning for their claim
constructions320—possibly on the grounds that the Federal Circuit will be
conducting their own analysis or possibly because anything that they
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Cf. Edward D. Manzo, How to Improve Patent Claim Interpretations, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 203,
207–09 (2012) (noting that patent law experts have traditionally been limited to describing Patent
Office procedures, but suggesting a broader role in addressing claim drafting and prosecution practices).
319
See Golden, supra note 91, at 383–85.
320
See, e.g., Hollingsworth & Vose Filtration Ltd. v. Delstar Techs., Inc., No. 10-788 GMS (D.
Del. Jul. 10, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/100456939/Hollingsworth-Vose-FiltrationLtd-v-Delstar-Techs-Inc-C-A-No-10-788-GMS-D-Del-Jul-10-2012 (Order Construing the Terms of
U.S. Pat. No. 6,623,548) (cursory opinion with no discussion of factual predicates, evidentiary sources,
or explication of the claim construction process; footnotes limited to discussion of intrinsic sources and
Federal Circuit jurisprudence); Shelbyzyme LLC v. Genzyme Corp., No. 09-768 GMS (D. Del. Jul. 8,
2011), available at http://www.delawareiplaw.com/2011/07/chief_judge_sleet_claim_constr.html
(Order Construing the Terms of U.S. Pat. No. 7,011,831) (cursory opinion with a footnote summarizing
Federal Circuit precedent emphasizing the primacy of intrinsic evidence and noting that “the parties
presented conflicting extrinsic evidence . . . which the court will not consider”); In re Alfuzosin
Hydrochloride Patent Litig., No. 08-md-1941 GMS (D. Del. May 20, 2009), available at http://
www.delawareiplaw.com/2009/06/chief_judge_gregory_m_sleet_claim_construction_order.html
(Order Construing the Terms of U.S. Patent No. 4,661,491) (cursory claim construction ruling with
minimal explanation); In re Rembrandt Techs., LP Patent Litig., No. 07-md-1848 GMS, 2008 WL
5773604 (D. Del. 2008) (construing over 100 claim terms without setting forth any analysis in the claim
construction order).
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explain can and will be used against them in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.321
In addition to compromising the care and logic that comes from
building a factual record and preparing a reasoned opinion, the de novo
review regime undermines the appellate process. The parties, the public,
and the appellate court lack the fully developed record and reasoned
opinion that would enable them to get a transparent view of what occurred
and to evaluate its correctness. Instead, de novo review substitutes an
independent review of an anemic record—typically limited to the intrinsic
evidence.
On the other side of the balance, the argument can be made that de
novo review improves the quality of patent adjudication by providing
independent analysis of a patent’s metes and bounds by an experienced
appellate tribunal. Yet that check is only as good as the record and the
ability of the appellate jurists to evaluate the most pertinent evidence, both
of which are contradicted by the foregoing analysis. Former Chief Judge
Michel came to believe that de novo review “inundat[es]” the Federal
Circuit “with the minutia of construing numerous disputed claim terms (in
multiple claims and patents) in nearly every patent case” notwithstanding
that trial judges often have a comparative advantage in mastering the full
record and better understanding the skilled artisan’s perspective.322
An argument can also be made that the Federal Circuit provides a
potential check on inexperienced district court jurists or “renegade”
districts.323 Yet de novo review of claim construction rulings does not
appear to be an effective tool for addressing these concerns. Empirical
321

Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
138 F.3d 1448, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the
judgment, and joining part IV of the en banc opinion) (suggesting that the de novo standard encourages
trial judges to “disguise the real reasons for their interpretation”).
322
Amgen, 469 F.3d at 1040 (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc) (suggesting that de novo review “inundat[es]” the Federal Circuit “with the minutia of
construing numerous disputed claim terms (in multiple claims and patents) in nearly every patent
case”); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the need for the trier of fact to “make[] findings that depend on
the weight, credibility, and probative value of conflicting evidence” to determine how a person skilled
in the art understands “technologic terms and words of art” used in patent claims), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
323
See Donald R. Dunner, A Retrospective of the Federal Circuit’s First 25 Years, 17 FED. CIR.
B.J. 127, 130 (2008) (noting that the Eastern District of Texas is perceived as pro-patentee); Jeanne C.
Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1462–65 (2010) (noting widespread forum shopping
in district courts); Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 193, 210–15 (2007) (arguing that juries in the Eastern District of Texas are plaintiff
friendly); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 903–07 (2001). But cf. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s
“Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 136–43 (2008)
(suggesting alternative explanations for the Eastern District of Texas’s popularity as a patent venue).
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research indicates that experienced jurists have fared no better than novices
on claim construction appeals324 and that the Eastern District of Texas—
which has been a magnet for nonpracticing entity patent cases—has not
fared worse than average on claim construction reversals.325 Furthermore,
other doctrines—such as venue326—are available to address concerns about
districts seeking to attract patent cases. Shifting to a more deferential
standard on claim construction would not eliminate judicial review
altogether.
The private and social costs of the de novo standard of review at the
adjudication-specific level manifest in various ways: lower quality
decisionmaking at both the trial and appellate levels, higher costs of
litigation as a result of more appeals and retrials following reversals,
greater uncertainty regarding the litigation,327 longer case pendency and
litigation costs as a result of fewer and delayed settlements,328 the
distraction and disruption of litigation on the technology marketplace, and
the added burdens on the judiciary and the judicial system.329 Much of the
324

See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 279.
As reflected in Appendix C, the Eastern District of Texas has experienced the lowest reversal
rate among the most active patent districts over the 2000–2010 period.
326
See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(ordering venue transfer where U.K. plaintiff incorporated affiliate and established office without
employees in Tyler, Texas, sixteen days before filing suit there); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d
1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (ordering transfer out of the Eastern District of Texas where “the plaintiff
is attempting to game the system by artificially seeking to establish venue by sharing office space with
another of the trial counsel’s clients”); In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (ordering transfer from Eastern District of Texas where plaintiff’s only connection to
transferring district was storing electronic documents locally); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d
1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (ordering venue transfer where “there [wa]s no relevant connection
between the actions giving rise to this case and the Eastern District of Texas except that certain vehicles
containing TS Tech’s headrest assembly have been sold in the venue”). See generally MENELL, supra
note 17, § 2.3.3.1 (discussing venue transfer motions).
327
See Holderman, supra note 5, at 11 (listing the de novo standard of review in claim construction
as among the factors contributing to the uncertainty of patent litigation).
328
See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Clark,
District Judge (E.D. Tex.), concurring) (suggesting that “the current de novo standard of review for
claim construction may result in the unintended consequences of discouraging settlement, encouraging
appeals, and, in some cases, multiplying the proceedings”); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (suggesting that de novo review “discourage[s] settlements”); Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV of the en banc opinion) (suggesting that the de novo
review standard would discourage and delay settlement).
329
See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc. 320 F.3d 1317, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 50) (“[A] change in the claim construction at the appellate level generally necessitates a remand to
the district court to consider new factual issues unless the record on appeal supplies substantial evidence
to support the jury verdict under the new claim construction.”); Moore, supra note 1, at 2–3 (footnotes
omitted) (“In the absence of a route for expedited appeal of claim construction, district courts are forced
to proceed with lengthy and expensive patent litigation based on their frequently erroneous claim
construction.”).
325
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cost—both private and social—derives from the discouraging effect of de
novo review on early settlement of patent cases. As noted earlier, the costs
of appellate review are relatively low in comparison to the costs of
litigating a patent case through trial. Therefore, parties who lose at trial are
far more likely to pursue an appeal under the de novo standard than they
would be under a more deferential regime. This not only delays resolution,
but also results in a substantial number of retrials. Overall, the de novo
standard has raised the cost of patent litigation without any discernible
benefits in terms of improved decisionmaking at the adjudication-specific
level.
2. Systemic Effects.—The Federal Circuit based its de novo standard
on promoting better notice, certainty, and national uniformity of patent
boundaries.330 The Federal Circuit’s logic appears to be that as the national
appellate patent court, the Federal Circuit is uniquely positioned to provide
nationally uniform interpretations of patent boundaries. It is doubtful,
however, that de novo review of claim construction rulings serves these
goals due to structural and practical problems.
At the structural level, the Federal Circuit has limited authority to
declare the boundaries of a patent beyond the parties in the suit.331 The
Federal Circuit’s interpretation of a patent in one case cannot be asserted
offensively by the patentee in a later infringement action against other
defendants, although it can bar the patentee from seeking an alternative
interpretation.332 Because the patent system has no mechanism for
conclusively establishing patent scope with regard to all potential
infringers, the certainty that flows from appellate interpretations is not
ironclad as subsequent defendants can potentially bring new evidence or
more effective advocacy to bear on claim meaning. Thus, while de novo
review increases the likelihood that the Federal Circuit will construe a
patent in the same manner across cases, the limited benefits of that
uniformity are outweighed by the drawbacks of refusing deference.333 What
330

See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1455 (noting that “treating interpretive issues as purely legal will
promote (though not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on
those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals
court” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391
(1996))); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(grounding its view that claim construction is a matter of law on the principle that “it is only fair (and
statutorily required) that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable degree the scope of the
patentee’s right to exclude”), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370.
331
See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 317, 350 (1971).
332
See MENELL, supra note 17, §§ 5.3.2.5, 5.3.3, 5.3.4 (discussing reasoned deference, judicial
estoppel, and stare decisis as applied to claim construction rulings).
333
See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1109, 1149–50 (2010) (noting that de novo review “increases certainty by ensuring that each
patent will be subject to a uniform claim construction” while decreasing certainty by making district
court claim constructions more vulnerable to reversal).
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our analysis shows is that achieving that goal through de novo review of
patent claim construction misapprehends comparative institutional analysis
at a heavy cost. Claim clarity can and should be handled through the claim
indefiniteness doctrine334 and through greater efforts by the Patent Office to
ensure that patent claims are clear at the front end of patent protection.335
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has overemphasized the role of
intrinsic evidence in claim construction in its idealized, but flawed, view
that patent claims should have a singular meaning to the public. Yet by
failing to fully recognize that the “public” in the patent context means
skilled artisans to whom trial judges have greater access, the Federal
Circuit has substituted its own views of intrinsic evidence for the more
subtle and multifaceted view that is possible at the trial court level. In so
doing, it has distorted and supplanted the appropriate role for skilled
artisans in the delineation of patent claim boundaries. As our empirical
analysis indicates, the Federal Circuit’s review of claim construction rarely
addresses the skilled artisan perspective.336 Thus, de novo review focused
on often ambiguous intrinsic evidence produces an artificial sense of clarity
and uniformity.
At a more practical level, the sheer number of patents (and patent
claims) issued annually by the Patent Office337 severely limits the Federal
Circuit’s ability to provide more than a thimble-sized solution to an oceansized challenge. The Federal Circuit is able to review a very small subset of
the millions of patent claims granted each year, and this occurs only after
years of litigation and typically hundreds of thousands or millions of
dollars spent on litigation. There is little reason to believe that the Federal
Circuit’s arrogation of primacy over claim construction has done much if
anything to promote greater certainty over patent claim boundaries.338
The Federal Circuit’s desire to promote universal meaning and
certainty is laudable, but misdirected. The nature of the patent system and
due process considerations point toward a multi-institutional solution to
achieving optimal notice. Relying on the Federal Circuit to operate as an
effective “quiet title” institution misapprehends its fundamental
characteristics and the challenge of promoting clear boundaries within a
system that produces millions of intangible property “parcels” per year.
334

“When a claim cannot be construed, it is indefinite, and therefore invalid.” MENELL, supra note
17, § 5.2.4.2.
335
See Peter Menell, It’s Time to Make Vague Software Patents More Clear, WIRED (Feb. 7, 2013,
4:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/02/its-time-to-make-vague-software-patents-moreclear/.
336
See supra Part II.C.6.
337
See PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENTS
STATISTICS CHART, CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2012 (noting 276,788 patent grants in 2012), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm.
338
See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 355, 382 (observing that “de novo review delays certainty”).
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The Patent Office can and should play a more central role in achieving
clear patent boundaries at the front end and developing taxonomies, search
tools, and other mechanisms for reinvigorating the patent system’s role in
resource planning.339 By contrast, the Federal Circuit should focus upon
quality control of patent trial tribunals, bearing in mind their institutional
limitations. Although this could occasionally produce incongruities in
patent meaning across different lower courts, the costs of overlooking the
inherently factual nature of patent claim construction—in terms of loss of
transparency, litigation delays and costs, and discouragement of
settlement—significantly outweigh the questionable uniformity benefits.
C. A Hybrid Appellate Review Standard
These jurisprudential and functional considerations support a standard
of appellate review that depends primarily on the evidentiary basis of the
claim construction determination and secondarily on a general balancing of
accuracy and process costs in patent adjudication. The basis for “deferring”
to lower court claim constructions is not trial judges’ policy expertise or
experience vis-à-vis the Federal Circuit but rather the inherently factual
aspects of patent claim construction: tracing the origins of disputed terms,
characterizing their basis (whether a claim term has special meaning to
skilled artisans, claim drafters generally, or the particular
patentee/prosecuting attorney or agent—i.e., the patentee is a lexicographer
with respect to the claim term in question), and deciphering the meaning of
the contested claim term from the perspective of a skilled artisan. As the
Supreme Court has explained:
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the
superiority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of credibility.
The trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience
in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in
the court of appeals would very likely contribute only negligibly to the
accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.
In addition, the parties to a case on appeal have already been forced to
concentrate their energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their
account of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more
judges at the appellate level is requiring too much. As the Court has stated in a
different context, the trial on the merits should be “the ‘main event’ . . . rather
than a ‘tryout on the road.’” For these reasons, review of factual findings

339

See Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. Legal
Analysis 1, 33–34, 36 (2013); Peter S. Menell, Promoting Patent Claim Clarity (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley
Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2171287, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2171287.
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under the clearly-erroneous standard—with its deference to the trier of fact—
is the rule, not the exception.340

Yet the interpretation of intrinsic evidence—like the interpretation of
other documents, such as contracts and statutes—inclines toward de novo
or independent review. Even here, however, the “mongrel” character of
patent claim construction suggests a reviewing court should be cautious in
overturning the district court’s determination. Unlike a statute (which is
viewed from a lay perspective),341 the intrinsic evidence in a patent case is
viewed from the standpoint of a skilled artisan. Thus, the proper standard
of review must integrate deferential review of factual predicates with
something approaching de novo review of documentary sources to achieve
the ultimate appellate determination. We say “something approaching de
novo review” for intrinsic evidence because even those documents must be
viewed from the perspective of the skilled artisan, which the trial court is
better positioned to perceive. Thus, like the claim construction
determination itself, the appellate standard is distinctively “mongrel” in
character.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[f]indings of fact,
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”342 Thus, the Federal
Circuit must defer to trial judges’ factual determinations in claim
construction rulings. Since the patent document defines the invention, the
Federal Circuit retains a substantial check on the overall claim construction
determination through de novo authority over the intrinsic record and
whether the trial court’s factual finding inappropriately overrides more
specific intrinsic indications of the patent’s scope.
In practice, this proposed standard of review, consistent with the
Supreme Court’s Markman decision, will introduce a hybrid or sliding
scale character to appellate review depending on the quality of the patent
disclosure, nature of the disputed claim term (technical, common parlance,
glossary), evidentiary record, and the rationale for the trial court’s
construction. Where the patent clearly defines the disputed term, there will
be little or no role for fact-finding. But where the patent instrument is
opaque, the specification does not address the term (as can occur with
amended claims), or the term arguably diverges from common parlance,
then the judge’s resolution of conflicting testimony takes on much greater
moment.

340

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985) (omission in original)
(quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).
341
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 325–27 (1990) (discussing intentionalist interpretation).
342
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574–75.
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Consequently, where the claim term is particularly susceptible to
PHOSITA construction, the district court’s ruling would carry great weight.
But where the term is set forth or substantially constrained by the
specification or prosecution history, then the intrinsic record would control.
Even in this latter circumstance, however, we believe that the Federal
Circuit should apply a heightened standard for reversal, such as a showing
by the challenger of unambiguous evidence in the intrinsic record
supporting an alternative construction. In general, this approach would be
more deferential than de novo review, but also reflect fidelity to the
intrinsic record where it provides unambiguous claim restrictions. Thus,
trial courts’ claim construction rulings should be upheld if not clearly
erroneous or clearly contradicted by the specification or prosecution
history.
This process would begin, as current claim construction practice
does,343 with the trial judge attempting to determine the plain and ordinary
meaning of the patent claim terms within the context of the claim. The trial
judge would then determine whether the claim term has particular meaning
based on its usage in the technical art, its claim drafting convention, the
patent specification, or some combination of these considerations. The
more deferential standard of appellate review would invigorate trial courts’
development of the factual record and place greater emphasis on skilled
artisans, inventors, patent attorneys, and patent agents in tracing the
drafting of patent claim terms and their understanding to skilled artisans in
the context of the particular patent.344 This could produce battles of the
experts, but no more so than in other areas in which courts must view
documents or other evidence from a specialized standpoint.
Over time, the district courts will likely better account for the fact–law
distinction in their Patent Local Rules and Markman hearings. For
example, courts could require litigants to more clearly set forth the intrinsic
and extrinsic bases for claim construction, requiring a party seeking to
bring forward expert testimony to disclose any gaps in the intrinsic record
which skilled artisan testimony could fill. Furthermore, courts could
innovate in the use of focused evidentiary hearings, possibly in conjunction
with tutorials, for efficiently developing a factual record for claim
construction.
It will be important for trial judges to incorporate into their analysis
the overarching notice goal of the patent system—that patent claims should
be understood objectively from the standpoint of skilled artisans unless the
patent affords an unambiguous scope. As William C. Robinson explained
343

See MENELL, supra note 17, § 5.2.3.2.1.
See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
536 (1947) (“If a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not to assume that Congress
intended its words to be read with the minds of ordinary men. If they are addressed to specialists, they
must be read by judges with the minds of the specialists.”).
344
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more than a century ago, intrinsic evidence should play a critical role in
claim construction, but courts should not be constrained in their resort to
expert witnesses to assist them in reaching their interpretation.345
CONCLUSION
Since the resurgence of patent jury trials in the 1980s, the U.S. patent
system has undergone a series of experiments aimed at improving the
delineation of patent scope. While the Supreme Court’s Markman decision
usefully removed claim construction from the black box of jury
deliberations, the Federal Circuit’s efforts over the past sixteen years to
guide claim construction have deeply frustrated the trial courts and failed to
achieve transparent and effective results. In particular, the Federal Circuit’s
adherence to the view that claim construction is a pure question of law
subject to de novo appellate review has distorted the evidentiary foundation
of claim construction determinations, delayed settlement of patent cases,
run up litigation costs, and turned appellate review of nearly every patent
case into relitigation of patent claim terms.
As our empirical evidence reveals, the Federal Circuit has largely, but
informally, renounced the de novo standard since its Phillips decision in
2005. Whereas in 2004 the court reversed 44% of the claim terms it
reviewed, in 2011 it did so for only 20% of terms. In one sense, therefore,
claim construction has become more predictable; a favorable construction
at the trial level is much more likely to withstand appellate review. That
certainty should lead to increased predictability and lower costs for parties
engaged in litigation. The rise of informal deference is likely a case of the
realities of judging outpacing the law—many judges on the Federal Circuit
have expressed criticism of the de novo standard, but the court has yet to
formally alter the standard.
This does not mean, however, that the problems of de novo review
have been adequately resolved. The proper standard integrates fact-finding
based on experts who can illuminate the perspective of skilled artisans and
claim drafters with careful review of the intrinsic record. Lower courts’
assessments of such evidence should be upheld if not clearly erroneous or
clearly contradicted by the specification or prosecution history. The Federal
Circuit should review the intrinsic record on a more independent basis, but
with due regard for the district court’s deliberations, proximity to the full
record, and integration of the skilled artisan perspective. Were the Federal
Circuit to embrace such a standard, lower courts would openly exercise
their discretion to receive such evidence and build a forthright record
supporting their interpretation. Such a hybrid appellate standard would
foster better development of the basis for claim construction analysis while
promoting earlier settlement of patent litigation and lower litigation cost.
345
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See ROBINSON, supra note 79, §§ 732–33.
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Where the disputed claim term is particularly susceptible to skilled artisan
construction, the district court’s ruling would carry great weight. But where
the term is set forth or substantially constrained by the specification or
prosecution history, then the intrinsic record would control. But even in the
latter circumstance, the Federal Circuit should apply a heightened
standard—a showing by the appellant of unambiguous evidence in the
intrinsic record supporting an alternative construction—so as to promote
settlement and reduce litigation costs and uncertainty.
So long as the Federal Circuit clings to the view that claim
construction is a question of law subject to de novo review, district courts
will downplay their resort to experts and fact-finding in managing claim
construction. So while informal deference may increase certainty and
predictability, it undermines the quality of adjudication and appellate
review by failing to elicit relevant evidence and by perpetuating opaque
analysis and reasoning at the trial level. Thus, the time is ripe for the
Federal Circuit (or the Supreme Court) to formally acknowledge the failure
of the de novo experiment and articulate a more deferential standard that
comports with the inherent nature of patent claim construction as a
necessarily “mongrel”—mixed fact and law—practice.
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APPENDIX A
Coding Methodology
An overinclusive search query was performed in order to locate the
precedential and nonprecedential opinions dealing with claim construction.
Once the opinions were collected, human coders read each case to
determine relevancy.346 Cases that were deemed initially relevant were then
passed along to a team of coders. Because Rule 36 cases are summary
affirmances, it is impossible to determine relevancy from the appellate
order. Therefore, coders examined the appellate briefs to determine initial
relevancy of those cases.
The “final disposition” code of each term (affirmed, reversed, avoided)
serves as the basis for the reversal rates that appear throughout this Article.
Avoidance of claim construction appeals often occurs when the Federal
Circuit invalidates a patent (e.g., on obviousness grounds) and therefore
does not reach other appealed issues that involve claim construction (e.g.,
infringement). Additionally, appeals arising from the United States Patent
and Trademark Office were not included in the database because the
USPTO’s
claim construction standard (“broadest reasonable
interpretation”) differs from that of the district courts.
For technological areas, we coded each term according to a
classification system used in previous studies of technology patenting.347
Because patented inventions often straddle the boundaries of multiple
technology categories, we permitted coding of up to four technology areas
for each claim term.348
For opinion cases (non-Rule 36 decisions), we collected
“construction evidence”—data regarding the evidentiary sources referenced
by the Federal Circuit in reaching its decision. This evidence relates to both
the source of construction evidence (e.g., dictionaries) as well as the
location of the evidence within the patent document (e.g., prosecution
history). This information is not available for Rule 36 cases.

346

Relevancy was defined as any case in which the meaning of a claim term was challenged on
appeal. Thus, certain cases were excluded from our database that involved issues of claim construction,
but did not involve appellate review of claim construction decisions. Those cases include: (1) cases in
which the district court’s failure or refusal to construe a claim is challenged; (2) cases discussing
formerly construed terms (either in separate cases or in a prior appeal of the case); (3) appeals of
indefiniteness decisions; (4) appeals of prosecution history estoppel claims; (5) broadening reissue
cases; (6) appeals of infringement or noninfringement that involve, but do not challenge, the meaning of
claim language; and (7) doctrine of equivalents cases.
347
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 272, at 2148 tbl.1. We used Allison and Lemley’s system
with one additional category: business methods.
348
Coders were asked to code at least one and up to four relevant technology areas. Because many
cases can be coded as multiple technologies (for instance, “mechanical” and “automobile-related”), the
percentages of all the technologies will sum greater than 100%.
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Coded Variables
Variable

Coding

Lower Court
Decision Date

String
Date

Procedural Posture on Appeal

(1) Jury trial, (2) Bench trial, (3) Summary
Judgment, (4) Mandamus, (5) Other

Federal Circuit Panel
(Authoring Judge & Panel Members)

Judge Name

Federal Circuit Dissenting Judge
(if any)349

Judge Name

Precedential Nature of Opinion

(1) Precedential, (2) Nonprecedential,
(3) Rule 36

Final Disposition of Case on Appeal

(1) Affirm, (2) Reverse, (3) Reverse and
Remand, (4) Vacate, (5) Vacate and Remand,
(6) Other

Field of Technology of the patent
(up to four)

(1) Mechanics, (2) Semiconductors,
(3) Business Method, (4) CommunicationsRelated, (5) Computer-Related,
(6) Pharmaceuticals, (7) Automobile-Related,
(8) Biotechnology, (9) Chemistry,
(10) Electronics, (11) Medical Devices,
(12) Energy-Related, (13) Optics,
(14) Software, (15) Acoustics

Final Disposition of
Claim Construction350

(1) Affirmed, (2) Reversed, (3) Avoided

Identify Person of Ordinary Skill
(PHOSITA)
Perspective of PHOSITA discussed?
Intrinsic Evidence—Specification
Intrinsic Evidence—Same Claim
Intrinsic Evidence—Other Claims
Intrinsic Evidence—Prosecution History
Extrinsic Evidence—
Expert Testimony/Tutorial
Extrinsic Evidence—Dictionaries/Treatises
Extrinsic Evidence—Other

349
350

Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N
Y/N

We also coded for the relevance of the dissent to the claim construction issue appealed.
Avoided cases were not included in the results for this Article.
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APPENDIX B
Voting Patterns by Judge (50 Term Rolling Average)
Archer

Bryson

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
00

02

04

06

08

10

12

00

02

Friedman

04

06

08

10

12

02

04

06

08

10

12

00

02

04

06

08

10

12

04

06

08

10

12

04

06

08

10

12

08

10

12

00

02

04

06

08

02

04

06

02

10

12

02

04

06

08

10

12

00

02

10

12

06

08

10

12

04

06

08

10

12

10

12

10

12

Newman
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

00

02

04

06

08

10

12

00

02

Rader

08

04

Lourie

04

06

08

Schall

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
00

00

Moore

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
02

00

Prost

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

06

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Plager

00

04

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Michel
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

02

02

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Mayer
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
00

00

Linn

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
00

Dyk
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Gajarsa

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

80

Clevenger
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
00

02

04

06

08

10

12

00

02

04

06

08

108:1 (2014)

Informal Deference

APPENDIX C
Reversal Rates by District
District
ITC
N.D. Cal.
C.D. Cal.
S.D.N.Y.
N.D. Ill.
E.D. Tex.
E.D. Va.
D. Mass.
D. Del.
D. Minn.
D.N.J.
W.D. Wis.

Pre-Phillips
Reversal Rate
(# of terms)

Post-Phillips
Reversal Rate
(# of terms)

Overall
Reversal Rate
(2000–2010)

50.0% (24)
34.7% (101)
48.3% (58)
43.8% (48)
25.0% (56)
31.8% (22)
42.9% (42)
22.9% (35)
40.0% (65)
50.0% (30)
44.0% (25)
12.5% (16)

20.9% (43)
13.1% (61)
33.8% (65)
37.9% (29)
29.5% (44)
12.5% (48)
11.4% (35)
40.0% (30)
17.6% (51)
17.4% (23)
22.2% (18)
24.0% (25)

31.3% (67)
26.5% (162)
40.7% (123)
41.6% (77)
27.0% (100)
18.6% (70)
28.6% (77)
30.8% (65)
30.2% (116)
35.8% (53)
34.9% (43)
19.5% (41)
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APPENDIX D
Regression Analysis351
Variable
Phillips Decision Date (Before/After)
Mechanical Patent
Semiconductor Patent
Business Method Patent
Communications-Related Patent
Computer Patent
Pharmaceutical Patent
Biotech Patent
Chemical Patent
Electrical Patent
Medical Device Patent
Energy-Related Patent
Software Patent
Judge Michel
Judge Friedman
Judge Newman
Judge Mayer

351

Model 1 (Phillips Decision)
.744997
(.1183801)***
-.2951718
(.1492575)*
-.5581067
(.2496073)*
-.9977604
(.2664371)***
.0239936
(.2025926)
-.4713033
(.1625094)**
.5440078
(.2698196)*
-.5266175
(.2579594)*
-.4871186
(.1876407)**
-.2586631
(.146301)
-.6095261
(.1752781)**
.7468069
(.508278)
.2441988
(.1940789)
.3139206
(.2435436)
.3042246
(.3001979)
.5820316
(.232259)*
.3819203
(.2411087)

This Table reports a logistic regression model that predicts Disposition_Term—a variable that is
positive when the Federal Circuit affirms the claim construction of the district court. The explanatory
variables include: Phillips (a binary variable that is positive when a case occurs after the Phillips
decision), technology categories (binary variables that are positive when a patent covers a particular
field of technology), and Federal Circuit judges present on the panel (binary variables that are positive
when particular judges appear on the panel). The values reported are odds ratios and (standard errors).
Significance is indicated as follows:
(*), p ≤ .05 (Significant at the .05 level)
(**), p ≤ .01 (Significant at the .01 level)
(***), p ≤ .001 (Significant at the .001 level)

N = 1745
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108:1 (2014)
Judge Plager
Judge Lourie
Judge Clevenger
Judge Rader
Judge Schall
Judge Bryson
Judge Gajarsa
Judge Linn
Judge Dyk
Judge Prost
Judge Moore

Informal Deference
.3122942
(.2921773)
.2799947
(.2294993)
.4470275
(.2430533)
-.0845397
(.2316365)
.1379078
(.2340243)
.220215
(.2348821)
.3402931
(.2296979)
-.2966732
(.2301291)
-.2218544
(.2366453)
.409444
(.2474897)*
.1900034
(.2822021)
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